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Abstract
then aims to empirically  determine  the significant  actually  able to explain.  These  reveal that both theories
factors  that affect  the levels of budget deficits  of central  are generally  weak in accounting  for intertemporal
governments  across time and across countries.  He  changes in budget deficit shares for both industrial  and
empirically  tests  two prominent theories of budget  developing  countries.  The  theories performed
deficits-the  Barro (1979)  tax-smoothing approach, and  significantly better in accounting for cross-section
the still-untested  theory of negative bequest motives  differences.  The author has many contributions to  the
advocated by Cukierman  and Meltzer  (1989). The  literature.  First, he analyzes the question of what
author uses econometric  techniques including  fixed-  determinies  the size of central  governm1ent budget deficits
effects  (both country and time) panel  regressions  using cross-country  time series data leading into the
spanning 87 countries over the period  1975 to 1992, and  1990s. Second,  he provides empirical tests of the
the Griliches  treatmeent  of missing data.  Chen finds  still-untested Cukiermani-Meltzer  (1989)  negative
relatively  stronger statistical  support for the tax-  bequest motive theory of budget  deficits.  By using the
smoothing approach  among developing countries but not  panel data, Chen attempts  to determine  the  factors that
in industrial countries.  The existence of empirical  influence not only the intertemporal  differences  in
evidence  supporting the theory of negative bequest  budget deficits  but also those factors that lead to cross-
motives is indeterminate.  The author  also conducted  country differences.  Last but not least,  he provides some
post-regression  analyses to assess the proportion of  preliminary  evidence  that poverty reduction  is necessary
observed  differences  in budget deficits  the factors were  for long-terni  government budget deficit reduction.
This paper  is a product of the Global  Knowledge  and Learning Division, World Bank Institute.  Copies of the paper are
available free from  the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact Derek Chen, room J2-
178,  telephone  202-458-1602,  fax  202-522-1492,  email  address  dchen2@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working
Papers are also posted  on1  the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  June 2003.  (70 pages)
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1.  Introduction
The characteristic  of  the United States federal government budget in the 1950s and 1960s
was that of small budget deficits, ranging from 1 to 2 percent of GDP, alternated with occasional
surpluses  (Figure  1.1).  The beginning  of the  1970s saw the end to this trend, with the  federal
government  running  budget  deficits  that  were  not  only persistently  large,  but  also  generally
increasing  as a share  of GDP.  This trend continued  until  1993,  after which the federal  budget
made  the sudden  recovery  towards being balanced.  This recovery  has led to the fiscal year of
1998  to  be  somewhat historical,  with the occurrence  of the first budget surplus  of the federal
government budget in nearly thirty years.
Cross-country  time  series  data  surprisingly  reveal  a  substantial  numnber  of  other
developed  and  developing  countries  that  have  experienced  a  V-shaped  trend  in  their  central
government  budget  surplus  shares,  very  similar  to  that  experienced  by  the  United  States.
However, there are also other countries that, in one way or another, did not conform to the above
trend.  The above brings one to ask the question that is central to this paper: what determines the
size of deficits of national  governments?
This paper  focuses on empirically  determining the significant  factors that influence the
size of government budget deficits.  Possible  factors that explain cross-country and intertemporal
differences,  will  be  both  examined.  In  particular,  it tests  two  prominent  theories  of budget
deficits,  namely the Barro (1979) tax-smoothing  approach,  and the still largely-untested  theory of
negative bequest motives  advocated  by Cukierman  and Meltzer  (1989).  Using a panel  data set
that includes  87 countries  for the time period  1975 to  1992,  cross-section  and panel regressions
are estimated with the variables postulated by the two theories.
Cukierman and Meltzer  (1989)  developed a theory of budget  deficits  that focuses  on the
intergenerational  redistributive  aspect of government  debt.  They argue that there  exist bequest-
constrained individuals, who would  like to transfer resources  from  future  generations to finance
current consumption,  via negative  bequests.  However, given that such negative bequests are not
socially enforceable,  bequest-constrained  individuals  will favor any fiscal  policy that decreases
current  taxes  without  decreasing  current  government  expenditures.  Thus,  in  a  democratic
political  system,  the  larger  the  share  of bequest-constrained  individuals  in the  population,  the
more  likely  is  the  government  to  run  larger  deficits.  Based  on  this  scenario,  Cukierman  and
Meltzer  postulate  that  increases  in  the  expected  rate  of economic  growth,  the  spread  of the
income  distribution  or  expected  longevity  tends  to  increase  the population  share  of bequest-
constrained individuals, which will consequently lead to larger budget deficits.3
The  second  model  that  this  paper  is  concerned  with  is  the  tax-smoothing  model
advocated by Barro (1979).  Barro argues that the dominant motive behind the running of budget
deficits  and  surpluses  by  central  governments  is  the  minimization  of  the  deadweight  loss
associated  with tax collection,  which requires  keeping a constant  tax rate for every period.  He
thus postulates that governments would run budget deficits  in periods  during which expenditures
are unexpectedly high or when the economy is in recession,  and vice versa.
The regression  results show  that the estimated  coefficients  for unanticipated  changes  in
government expenditures  and output are highly statistically significant  and of the correct sign for
the  developing  countries,  but not for  the developed  countries.  As  such, our  empirical  results
show that tax smoothing  is an important  consideration  for running budget  deficits and  surpluses
only  for  developing  countries.  In  contrast,  empirical  support  for  theory  of negative  bequest
motives is rather inconclusive.  First, the panel regressions do reveal that the expected growth rate
exerts  a  negative  effect on the  budget surplus  share,  which  is in  accord  with negative  bequest
motives.  However,  this effect is statistically significant for only developed countries,  and not for
developing  countries.  For  the  Gini  coefficient,  developed  countries  exhibit  a  positive  but
insignificant  coefficient,  while  the  developing  countries  have  an  insignificant  negative
coefficient.  Finally,  the  estimated  coefficient  of the  life  expectancy  variable  is  negative  but
significant for the developing countries, but not for the developed countries.
In summary,  the paper has many contributions  to  the literature.  First,  it is analyzes  the
question of what determines  the size of central  government budget  deficits using cross-country
time  series data leading into  the  1990s.  Second,  it provides  empirical  tests of the  still-untested
Cukierman-Meltzer  (1989) negative  bequest motive theory of budget deficits.  By using the panel
data,  this  paper  attempts  to  determine  the  factors  that  influence  not  only  the  intertemporal
differences  in budget deficits but also those factors that lead to cross-country differences as well.
Following this  introduction,  Section  2 will  briefly  present the  global  trends  in  budget
deficits  since the 1950s.  In doing so, it will highlight the interesting puzzles associated  with the
observed  trends.  Introduction  of the  theoretical  framework  of  the  Barro's  tax  smoothing
approach will be detailed  in  Section 3.  Section 4 will proceed  on to  introduce  the Cukierman-
Meltzer theory  of negative  bequest motives of budget deficits.  Section 5 of this paper will focus
on other factors that have been found to  significantly  influence the size of budget deficits  in the
literature.  Section 6 will present the sources of data, the construction of the variables to be used
as regressors  in the panel regressions  and the results of the regressions.  Section 7 will conclude
with the main findings of the paper.4
2.  Patterns  and  Puzzles
What determnines  the deficits and debts of national governments?  Why should they loom
larger at some times and in some countries,  and smaller in others?  We have partial theories;  some
explaining  changes  over time  and others  addressing  the  international  differences.  Yet only now
have enough data been gathered to allow global tests of the competing explanations.
Since the 1950s, an ever-growing  number of countries have supplied data on governnent
finances.  Adjusting  and assembling  these data makes  it possible  for this paper to reveal  some
striking  patterns  in  central-government  budget  balances  and  stocks  of public  debt.  Most
countries,  as we shall see, conformed to some previously unnoted time trends in their government
deficits and debts as a share of GDP.  Yet countries  still varied even more in their surplus shares
in any given year than the international  averages varied over time.
Both  the  revealed  global  movements  over tirne  and  the  contemporaneous  differences
between  countries pose challenges  for economic  theory.  This section surveys the global  trends
and international  differences  in deficits that have occurred from  1950 to the early  1990s.  Some of
the patterns are more puzzling than others, but they all invite new tests of competing theories.
2.1  Patterns: Global Trends
A simple way to grasp the global tendencies in government budget balances and stocks of
public  debt  is  to follow  simple  averages  of their shares  of GDP  over the  second half of the
twentieth  century.  Figures  2.1  and  2.2  plot  these averages  for  different  groups  of countries
supplying annual data for long periods.  The global tendencies between  1950 and  1999 divide into
three clear eras, with a fourth era possibly starting from 1993.
1.  From  mid-century to 1973
The  long initial postwar  era was-one  in which  deficits  seemed  to grow slowly  larger on
the average,  though neither their average  size nor the steepness of their trend is as striking as what
was to  follow.  In this period before  1973, only  14  out of 1116 country-years  of available data
saw  deficits  as  great as  10  percent  of GDP.  Over  the  same  period,  those  deficits  mere  small
enough in relation  to GDP that central-government  debt did not rise relative to annual GDP.
For the United States and the United Kingdom, at least, we know that pre-1950 trends
also showed no large net deficits over the very long run.  To judge from their experience since the
late  eighteenth  century,  the  only  sharp  increases  in the  debt-output  ratio  came  during  wars  or5
depressions.  Between these sharp  increases,  the government  would  run budget  surpluses to pay
off the debt accumulated,  leading to a decline of the debt-output ratio'.
2.  From  1973 to 1983
On the  average,  central  government  budgets  dropped  sharply  into  deficit from  1973  to
1975 and again from 1979 to  1983, with a slight plateau in between.  These drops corresponded,
of course, to  the two oil shocks.  At its worst,  the 94-country average budget deficit exceeds 6.3
percent of GDP in  1982.  These budget deficits correspondingly  led to the steady increase in the
debt-GDP  ratio,  from  26 percent  to  about  54  percent of GDP.  This  greater  tian  100 percent
increase  in  the  stock of debt  to  GDP ratio  occurred  despite  the  absence  of wars  or long-term
recessions.
3.  From  1983 to 1993
By contrast,  this period saw a clear net reduction  in deficit shares,  with deceleration in
the debtlGDP  ratio.  The  recovery pattern  was  not even,  however,  with a presumably  cyclical
relapse into greater deficits between  1990 and 1992.  Yet over the whole period, there was a clear
reduction  in the rate of deficit.
The years after  1993  might  eventually  be viewed  as  a  continuation  of the  1983-1993
recovery.  So far the most recent data have brought some further reduction  in deficits and an end
to the rise of the debtlGDP  ratio.  Let us  keep the post-1993  experience to one side, however,
unto the data for these most recent years are completed.
2.2  Patterns: Cross-Sectional Differences
While  sharing  in the global movements,  developed and  developing  countries,  as well  as
individual countries, varied greatly in their deficits  and debt growth.  Countries departed from the
global  averages  both  in the  timing of their  turning  points and  in their average  deficit  and debt
shares during any given time period.
2.2.1  Developed  and  Developing  Country Differences
Figure 2.3 shows separate plots of budget surplus shares for the developed (high-income)
and  developing  (non high-income)  countries.  We  see  that prior to the  first oil  shock of 1973,
'See  Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998), Anderson (1986) and Hoover and Siegler (2000).6
developing  countries were oil  average experiencing  larger budget deficit  shares compared to the
developed countries.  Developed countries were  on average running deficits about 1 to 2 percent
of GDP; while the developing countries  were generally having deficit  shares of approximately  2
to 3 percent.
With the onset of the first oil shock  in  1973, developing  and developing  countries alike
took the  steep  dive  into  larger  deficit  shares.  At their worst,  average  deficit  shares  for  both
groups of countries is larger than 6 percent in 1982-83.
Similar to budget suiplus shares plots in Figure 2.1, recovery from the great dive began
for  both  developed and  developing  countries  in  about  1983.  However,  divergent  trends  for
developed  and developing  countries  emerged  with the recovery.  While the developed  countries
were  able to recover  rapidly from the  great deficit dive,  the recovery was not sustained.  After
reaching  an  average  deficit  share  that  was  a little  over  2 percent  in  1988/89,  the  developed
countries experienced  a relapse  and deficit shares  steadily increased  to nearly 6 percent  in  1993.
Since  then  there  has  been  a strong  recovery,  with the  average  deficit  share  for  the developed
countries being approximately  balanced in  1998.
In  contrast,  the  developing  countries  made  a  slower  recovery  from  the  deficit  dive,
reaching their pre-dive levels only in the early 1990s.  In addition, the developing countries have
not,  at  least  based  on the  available  data,  suffered  a relapse  into  large  deficits,  as  have  the
developed countries.  In 1994, the average deficit share over 51  developing countries  was only 3
percent.  What factors could have led to the divergent trends in deficit  shares out of GDP between
developed and developing countries?
2.2.2  Individual Country Differences
For  several  countries,  the  chronology  of turning  points  in  the deficit  share  of GDP
differed noticeably from that average pattern shown in Figure 2.1.  Some countries  did not follow
the V-shaped budget trend at all.  For example, Finland and Switzerland have been running small
deficits  since  1950  but then took a  sudden  dive in the  early  1990s.  France  seems to be  in  a
category on its own.  From  1.950 to  1973,  it was moving  slowly from  deficits to  surpluses,  and
then it dropped into deficit along with the other countries  during  1973-1983.  It continued to run
even  deeper  deficits  to  1994,  before  tightening  up  in  an  attempt  to conform  to  the  Maastricht
Treaty's  call  for  deficits  within  3 percent.  Finland kept  balanced budgets,  more  or  less until
1990, then  had deficits  averaging  10  percent of GDP  for  the  next five  years,  partly because  it
attempted to peg its currency to the German mark at exactly the wrong moment in history.7
Apart from oddities of timing, some countries stood out over most of the period as having
particularly  deep  deficits  and  soaring  debt/GDP  ratios.  This  was  generally  true of Belgium,
Greece, Ireland,  Italy,  Israel, Morocco,  Oman, Sri  Lanka and Zambia, whose deficits were  often
over 10 percent of GDP.  Why these countries and not others?
2.3  Puzzles and Questions
Based  on the  observed  similarities  and  differences  in  the trends  of government  budget
surpluses from above, one would naturally ask the following questions:
1.  What  factors could have caused the United  States and the other countries to  exhibit the
V-shaped  budget  surplus  trend?  More  simply,  what were  the  factors  that caused  the
government budgets of these countries  to suddenly deteriorate  in the peacetime years  of
the early  1970s and what factors caused  the just as sudden recovery in the  1990s?  Why
did the historically deep budget deficits persist for a period of two decades of  peace?
2.  What  are  the  differences  between  developed  and developing  countries  such as  to lead
them to exhibit divergent trends in deficits  shares?
3.  Why did some countries exhibit the V-shaped  government  budget trend and others  did
not?  Are there are  economic  differences  between the countries that exhibited  the trend,
and those that did not?
4.  Why have  some  countries  been  able to run persistent  budget  surpluses  like Singapore,
while other countries, Belgium  and Italy for example, run persistent  deficits so much so
that their debt to output ratio is  more than  110 percent?
This paper is set to seek answers to the above questions.
3.  The Tax-Smoothing  Approach to Budget Deficits
This  section examines  closely  Barro's  Tax-Smoothing  Approach to budget  deficits.  It
reinforces  the ideas  behind the main implications  of the approach by providing  a more  detailed
explanation  of the theoretical  framework and assumptions.  In addition, it also provides a brief
survey of  the literature that focuses on the previous  testing of the model.
3.1  The Theoretical  Framework
Assuming that Ricardian equivalence  holds to a first-order  approximation,  Barro (1979)
proposed and tested a tax-smoothing theory of public debt, which is based on society's attempt to8
minimize  the  excess  burdern  of taxation  over  time.  Although the  amount of deadweight  loss
accrued due to taxation depends  on the  timning and composition  of tax collections,  Barro,  in this
paper,  only  focuses  on the minimization of the deadweight loss of taxation due to the timing of
tax collection.
The  Ricardian  propcsition  implies  that  shifts between  debt and tax  finance  for a given
amount of public expenditure would have no first-order effects on real macroeconomic  variables.
The  assumption that it holds excludes some of the typical  features of public debt analysis,  such as
shifting of the tax burden to future generations and the crowding  out of private investment,  etc.
As such, Barro's model abstracts from the intergenerational  reallocation of resources as a reason
for the issuance of public debt2.
The theory  focuses  on  a  closed  economy  without  capital  in  which  a large  national
government  that has jurisdiction  over a population  of given size, in which  any effects of public
debt policy  on migration3 is ignored.  The  government  needs  to finance  a certain  amount  of
expenditure in every period tby means of current income taxation and public debt issue4, with both
the  composition  of taxes and the  level  of government  expenditure  being  exogenously  given5.
Individuals  are assumed to have perfect  knowledge  of all  future exogenous  variables,  including
the levels of government  expenditure.  Also assumed  is that the real  rate of return on public  and
private debts is a constant.
Due to costs for tax administration and enforcement,  the collection of tax revenues results
in some  deadweight  loss or  excess burden.  In accordance  with public  finance  theory,  Barro
assumes  that the deadweight  loss for each  period  is directly proportional,  with a positive  second
derivative,  to the amount of tax revenue  collected and inversely proportional to the available tax
base.  The government  has an intertemporal  budget constraint  implying that the present value of
spending must equal the present value of taxes.
The  government's  optimization  problem  is  then  to  choose  the  amount  of  tax  to  be
collected  in each period  such  that the present value of deadweight loss is minimized,  subject to
the goveurnent's  intertemporal  budget constraint.  It can be  shown that the present value  of the
deadweight  loss of tax collection is minimized when the (average) tax  rate6 is constant in every
2Such features of public debt analysis are considered in Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), which is discussed in Section 4.
3This would  be an important consideration  for a local government.
4Note that currency issue as a method of financing government expenditure  is not considered  by Barro.
5Assuming that the level of government expenditure  is  exogenous  implies that Barro's model does not deal with the
detennination of  the size of the public sector.
6Barro defines the tax rate as the ratio of  the amount of tax revenue collected to the available tax base.9
time  period,  with  the  level  of  the  tax  rate  being  determined  by  the  intertemporal  budget
constraint.
Suppose that the United States federal government is initially running a balanced budget
and then  government expenditures  increase  unexpectedly  due to, say, a sudden outbreak of war
with Iraq.  The balanced budget rule would advocate that taxes to be temporarily increased  during
the  duration  of the  war,  so  that  additional  revenue  can  be  collected  to offset  the  additional
military  expenditures  that are incurred,  and to revert back to the original level of tax collections
once the war is over.  However,  note that since the tax base, at least  in the short run, remains
unchanged,  tax rates would increase significantly  during the war and then decrease significantly
after the war.
The tax-smoothing  approach will, instead, prescribe a near constant tax rate.  That is, it
will propose that taxes be increased by an infinitesimal  amount at the onset of the war  and then
held constant thereafter  (even after the war has ended).  Thus, assuming that the tax base remains
unchanged,  a deficit would result during the war and a surplus after the war.  The budget surplus
will compensates  for the deficit during the war, and therefore the inter-temporal  badget constraint
is not violated.
Note that compared  to  the  tax  smoothing  policy,  the balanced  budget policy  incurs  a
higher level of excess burden during the war, because of the higher tax rate, but a lower level of
excess burden in the after the war due to the relatively  lower tax rates.  Overall however, the tax
smoothing  policy  dominates  because  under  the  balanced  budget  policy,  the  additional  tax
distortions that are incurred during  wartime exceed the additional welfare gains of the lower tax
rates in postwar period.  This is due to the assumption of the positive  second order derivative  of
the deadweight  loss function with respect to the level of tax revenues  collected.  It thus follows
that under the tax smoothing policy, budget deficits and surpluses  are used as a buffer,  optimally
to minimize the distortionary effects of taxation, given a certain path of spending.  As such,  when
spending  is temporarily high, it will be optimal for the government to run a budget deficit in order
to keep the tax rate constant and budget surpluses when spending is temporarily low.
An important extension of this principle concerns the fluctuations of tax revenues due to
the business cycle.  Suppose  the economy  experiences  a temporary recession,  in which output is
low  in the  first period  and goes  back  to  its normal  level  in  the  second time  period.  The  tax-
smoothing approach dictates that, because of constant tax rates, that tax collections be reduced
during  the  recession,  which  would  result  in  a  budget  deficit,  given  an  unchanged  level  of
govemment  expenditure.  On  the  other  hand,  when  an  economic  boom  occurs,  it  would  be
optimal  for  the  level  of tax  revenue  collected  to  be  proportionately  increased,  resulting  in  a10
budget  surplus.  As  such,  with  regard  to  output  fluctuations,  the  tax  smoothing  approach
advocates  a  cyclically  adjusled,  balanced budget  rule:  the budget  should  be balanced  over the
business cycle, but not every fiscal year.
In sumnmary, the tax-smoothing approach postulates  governments run budget deficits and
surpluses  in an  effort  to  mrinimize  the  deadweight  loss  of taxation  by  keeping  the  tax  rate
constant.  It argues that governments  will run budget deficits  in the face of unanticipated  shocks
such as increases in government expenditures or decreases in output.  Conversely, during periods
of norimal  levels  of government  expenditure  and output,  governments  will  be running  budget
surpluses.  As such, the tax-simoothing  approach postulates that there exists a positive relationship
between unanticipated  changes in government  expenditure  and the budget deficit, and a negative
relationship between unanticipated  changes in output and the budget deficit.
3.2  Previous Tests on the Tax-Smoothing Approach
Barro (1979,  1987) tested the tax-smoothing model  for the United  States and the United
Kingdom and concluded that  tax-smoothing  behavior  was a dominant  reason for the running of
budget surpluses and deficits  for both countries.  Using U.S. data from  1917 to 1976 and British
data  from  1706  to  1918,  he  found  that  both  American  and  British experiences  are  generally
consistent  with the  basic principles  of tax-smoothing:  the  debt-to-GNP  ratios increase  during
wars, decrease  in peacetime, and fluctuate with the business cycle.
Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989b)  argues  that  if a  government  was  being  true  to  the  tax-
smoothing approach,  then the observed path of tax rates is likely to follow a mean-zero random
walk.  This is because  governments  that attempt to follow the constant  tax rate rule  would only
perform  adjustments  to  the  tax  rate  with  the  arrival  of  new  information  regarding  future
govermment  expenditures  and/or tax revenues.  It seems  reasonable  to assume  that such new
information would arrive in a random  fashion, resulting in seemingly  random adjustments  to the
tax rates, consequently  leading to the tax rate following  a mean-zero random walk.  Having a null
hypothesis  of a pure random  walk for tax rates,  versus an altemative  hypothesis  in the tax rates
have a constant non-zero  drift. They found that for the period  1960-1986,  12 out of 15  OECD
countries reject the null hypothesis, with the United  States, United Kingdom and Finland being
the exceptions.  As such, they concluded  that Barro's findings for empirical  support for the tax-
smoothing approach using data for the U.S. and the U.K., proved to be exceptions rather than the
rule.  However,  Sahasakul (1985)  also rejected  the random walk model  for taxes for the case  of
the United States when he found that other variables could help predict future changes in U.S. tax
rates.Recall the efficiency rule that called for the various taxes to be levied to the point where
the deadweight loss per dollar of marginal  tax revenue  is equalized  across the available  array of
taxes.  Given that seigniorage  financing is a kind of (implicit) tax and assuming that minimization
of the deadweight  loss  of taxation is  a goal of the tax authorities,  Mankiw  (1987)  suggested  a
rising path of total  revenues relative  to GDP  should be met by a rise both  in explicit taxes rates
and a rise  in  the inflation  taxation.  As  such,  inflation  and  tax rates  should be positively  and
significantly correlated.  He tests this proportion by examining the correlation of explicit tax rates
and the inflation rate (which  is taken  as a proxy of the tax rate on real money balances).  Using
U.S. data, he finds a positive and significant hypothesis.
Roubini  and Sachs (1989b)  extend Manliw's test to the other industrial countries.  They
find no general support for the hypothesis.  For 12 out of the  15 countries, there is no significant
relationship between  tax rates and the inflation  rate.  In addition,  for 5 out of the  12 countries
(France,  Austria,  Italy, Ireland  and Denmark),  the  sign of the  regression  coefficient  is  wrong,
implying that inflation  and tax rates  are negatively  correlated.  However,  they do find that the
hypothesis holds for the United States, Finland, and the Netherlands.
Roubini  (1991)  tested the  tax-smoothing  approach by  applying Mankiw's  test to data
from 92 developing countries for the period 1950-88.  He found positive and significant (at the 5
percent level) correlations between inflation  and tax rates for only 15 out of the 92 countries.  The
correlation  was  positive  but  not  statistically  significant  in  37  countries  and  negative  in  40
countries.
Another  implication of the tax-smoothing  approach  is that the real budget deficit should
be only a function of transitory shocks to output and government  spending.  Roubini (1991)  also
tested  this  hypothesis  using  data  for 48  developed  and  developing  countries  for  the  1970-87
period.  The  measure  of fiscal  deficit used was  the nominal  overall  deficit of the  consolidated
government  as a share of GNP.  As a proxy for the cyclical  component of output, he took the
growth rate  of real GNP;  the idea  is that  in  a  period of economic  slowdown  or recession  the
output  growth  will  be  low  or  negative  signaling  a  transitory  fall  in  output7. The  share  of
government spending to GNP (excluding interest payments) was used as a proxy for the transitory
component of spending.  He found evidence  that increases  in government  spending to GNP leads
to an increase in fiscal deficits.  More specifically, all 48 countries return a coefficient that was of
the right sign and was statistically  significant.  However,  he found little evidence of an effect of
7 We note that the GNP or GDP growth rate is a rather inappropriate  proxy for the cyclical component of output.  This
is because it is possible for high output growth to be experienced  even when the economy is well below potential GDP,
like during the recovery phase of the business  cycle.12
shocks to output  growth  on the fiscal  deficit.  Only 8 countries had coefficients  for the growth
variable that were of the correct sign and were statistically  significant.
4.  The Negative  Bequest Motive Theory of Budget Deficits
The tax-smoothing  approach  focuses  only on the second-order  effects of the deadweight
loss  due to  taxation.  It ignores  any first-order  intergenerational  redistribution  effects of public
debt  due  to  its  underlying  assumption  of  Ricardian  Equivalence.  However,  Ricardian
Equivalence  hinges  on  the  assumption  that  individuals  wish  to  make  positive  and  significant
bequests to their heirs8. Buclhanan  and Roback  (1987)  have argued that even in the absence of
fiscal  illusion,  positive intergenerational  bequests cannot be taken for granted.  They claim that
many individuals would actually like to make "negative bequests" by leaving debts to be paid off
by  their  heirs  rather  than  by  themselves.  Current  American  law  limits  the  obligation  of
descendants  to  payoff the pritvate  debts  of deceased  relatives,  but public  debts  incurred  by the
government may become the legal obligation of future generations  of citizens.  Therefore, public
debt may provide  the  opportunity  for intergenerational  transfers  from  children  to parents  that
cannot be done through incuning private debt.
In  light  of the  above,  Cukierman  and  Meltzer  (1989)  focused  on  intergenerational
redistributive  effects of public debt,  and proposed a political economy, general  equilibrium model
of debt  and  deficits based  on  intergenerational  transfers.  They  argue that there exist  bequest-
constrained  individuals who would like to transfer resources  from future generations to finance
current  consumption,  via  negrative  bequests.  As  mentioned,  since such negative  bequests  are
typically not socially enforceable, bequest-constrained  individuals will favor any fiscal policy that
decreases  current  taxes  without  decreasing  current  government  expenditures.  Thus;  in  a
democratic  political  system,  the  larger  the  share  of  bequest-constrained  individuals  in  the
population,  the more likely is  the  government to run larger  deficits.  Based on  this scenario,
Cukierman  and  Meltzer  theory  of negative  bequest  motives  postulate  that  increases  in  the
expected rate of economic  growth,  the spread of the income distribution or expected  longevity
tends  to  increase  the  population  share  of  bequest-constrained  individuals,  which  will
consequently lead to larger budget deficits.
8The notion of Ricardian Equivalence  first assumes that given  sufficient intergenerational altruism, the finite horizon of
each  generation  becomes  immaterial,  since  such altruism  creates  links  across generations  resulting  in one  implicit
generation with  an infinite horizon.  Given  this, Ricardian  Equivalence  postulates that the choice of how to finance a
given  level  of government  spendinl,  is irrelevant,  as a  first approximation.  In particular,  the  distribution  of the  tax13
4.1  The Theoretical  Framework
Cukierman  and Meltzer (1989), hypothesizing  a political theory cf government debt and
using  an  overlapping  generations  model  with  bequests,  attempted  to  identify  the  factors  that
determine  the  size  of budget  deficits  by  focusing  only  on  the  redistributive  role  of  the
government.  By doing  so,  they  abstract  from  the  function of the  government  as a provider of
public  goods  and  also  from  issues  that  relate  to the  minimization  of the  deadweight  loss  of
taxation over time.
Main Assumptions of the Model
The economy is represented  by an overlapping  generations structure with  bequests.  The
population  is assumed to be stationary  and the number of individuals in each generation,  denoted
by N, is identical across periods.  Their model assumes there is no uncertainty,  taxes are levied in
a lump-sum fashion on the young, and the old receive Social Security benefits.  Individuals work
only when  young  and  each  supplies  inelastically  one  unit of labor  each period.  There  exists
differences  in  ability  and,  consequently,  in  wage  rates  across  individuals.  The  production
function exhibits constant returns to scale technology.
Individuals  are able to transfer wealth from the first to second period of life by means of
savings either in the form of government bonds or capital investment.  Familial intergenerational
transfers,  if any, are assumed to flow only from the parent to the child, that is, such transfers exist
only in the form of bequests.  The  amount of bequests  differs  across  individuals.  As  will be
explained  below, the position of each  individual in the distribution  of wealth, his wage rate and
the  wage rates he  expects for future generations  in his family  determine his attitude  toward the
size of the budget deficit.  Given  individual  preferences,  majority  rule  determines  the current
period debt size and the current taxes chosen by voters.
Government  expenditure  is financed  by a combination of lump-sum taxes on the young
and  issuance  of one-period  government  bonds  that have  to be  repaid with  interest  in the next
period.  The  government  budget  constraint  therefore  implies  that  total  current  expenditure,
consisting  of social  security  payments plus  the principal  and  interest payments  on  last period's
government bonds,  must be  equal to  total  current  revenue,  consisting  of the  above  mentioned
lump  sum taxes  and  new bond  issue.  The  government  budget constraint,  normalized  by the
number of young or old individuals,  N, can be thus written as:
burden across generations  is not influenced by the size of the debt:  changes in public debt are compensated by changes
in private bequests.14
5, + (l + r,-,)b,-l = T, + bt  (1)
where
S,  is the social security payments paid out to the old in period t
r,-,  is the interest rate for period t-l
b,,1  is the amount of bonds issued in period  t-1 9
b,  is the amount of bonds issued in period  t
T,  is the amount of taxes levied in period t
Rearranging, we get the size ol' the budget deficit,
b, =St +(1+r,,  )b, l -Tt  (2)
which also denotes the stock oi' government  debt in period  t, since all bonds are one-period bonds.
Bequest Motives and Preferences  over the Budget Deficit
Cukierman  and Meltzer  argue  that Barro's  (1974) government  debt neutrality  theorem
does not hold  when  individueLls  differ  in productivity,  wage  earnings,  and  also in their initial
endowment.  This is because these differences  will give rise to some individuals who would like
to  leave a negative  bequest to their descendants.  However,  such bequests  cannot be discharged,
as  there  are  no  institutional  arrangements  that  can  obligate  their  descendants  to  do  so.  The
minimum  bequest  is  thus  constrained  to  zero  and  individuals  who  desire  to  leave  negative
bequests are termed as bequest-constrained  individuals.
Clearly,  such bequest-constrained  individuals will favor a fiscal policy that increases their
lifetime  income  at the expense  of future  generations  even  when  the present value  of the tax
change is zero.  For example, increased  Social Security benefits financed by debt issue shift taxes
forward  (that is,  into  the  futwue)  and  allow  bequest-constrained  individuals  to achieve  a higher
level of consumption.  Thus, with such individuals, the issuance  of government  debt will not be
neutral.  All other things equal, under a majority rule political system, this imnplies a larger share
of the population that is bequest-constrained  will tend to lead to a larger budget deficit.
Cukierman  and Meltzer  further argue that, in their general equilibrium  framework,  even
an  individual  who  is not  bequest-constrained,  and  does  not possess  negative  bequest  motives,
may still not be indifferent  to  a reallocation of resources  over time  that maintains present  value.
According  to them,  if there exist any bequest-constrained  individuals  in the economy, a present-
value-preserving  exchange  of taxes  for  public  debt  will  increase  the  consumption  of those15
individuals.  These  bequest-constrained  individuals  must  obtain  the  required  resources  for
additional  consumption  from the non-bequest-constrained,  who substitute bonds for real capital in
their portfolios.  While bonds and capital are perfect substitutes in portfolios, they are not perfect
substitutes  in production.  The  additional  debt  crowds  out  some  capital',  raising the return  to
capital and decreasing the return to labor.  Consequently,  individuals will favor a debt increase if
their income is largely capital income and will be against a debt increase if their income is maialy
labor income.  As such, even non-bequest-constrained  individuals may not be indifferent to such
intertemporal reallocations of resources that maintain present value  l.
Given the above arguments, whether individuals  favor a larger  budget deficit depends  on
three factors:
1.  the  amount  of benefits  they receive  from an  intergenerational  reallocation  of resources
(relevant only to bequest constrained  individuals),
2.  the magnitude of the increase in welfare they obtain from a higher return on assets, and
3.  the magnitude of the decrease in welfare they experience from a decrease in wage rates.
These factors will consequently  also deternine the proportion of individuals  in the economy who
will vote for a larger budget deficit.  Under a majority rule system, a larger the proportion of such
individuals will therefore lead to a larger budget deficit.
4.2  Major Implications:
Macroeconomic  Conditions Conducive to Larger Deficits 12
Based  on the  above  three  factors,  Cukierman  and  Meltzer  came up  with  the following
economic  conditions which tend to increase the size of the budget deficit'3 under a majority rule
political system.  These constitute the refutable hypotheses of their model.
9 Note that  all government  bonds issued are  one-period  bonds.  This  implies  that bonds issued in the preceding  period
must be retired and repaid in full with interest in the next period.
10  The  amnount  of  capital  that is  crowded  out  by  an  additional  unit  of debt  depends  on  the  fraction  of bequest-
constrained individuals in the economy and on the extent to which they are constrained.
I'  t is realized  that for small  open economies,  the issue of addition government  debt will  not lead to an increase  in
interest rates  and thus no crowding out of capital will occur.  This point will be reiterated  in a later section when the
regression results are analysis.
12 In  their  paper,  Cukierman  and  Meltzer  presented  one  proposition  for  the  macroeconomic  conditions  that  are
conducive  to  larger  debts  and  another  proposition  for  the  macroeconomic  conditions  that  are conducive  to larger
deficits.  Given that, debt equals  deficits in their model (due to the assumption  of one-period bonds), both propositions,
in fact, are equivalent.
13 Recall that since the entire  budget deficit is assumed to be financed by the issuance of one-period  bonds in the model,
the size of  the deficit in period  t will exactly  equal the amount of debt issued in period t, which also equals the stock of
debt in period t.16
Proposition:  Budgetary deficits are larger  under majority rule14,
a.  the larger  the expectecd rate  offfuture growth of  the economy,
b.  the larger  thefraction of  individuals  below a certain level of  income and wealth 15,
c.  the larger  the fraction of individuals whose main source of  income is NOTfrom wages'5,
d.  the larger  the spread  of  the distribution  of  income1 5, and
e.  the higher  the expectecd longevity
Explanation of Proposition:
a.  All other things being equal, the higher the expected rate of future economic  growth,  the
more the current generation will expect future generations  to be relatively better off. This
tends  to  increase  not  only  the  probability  that  the  current  generation  will  want  to
reallocate  resources  from  the  future  to  the  present,  but  also  increases  the  amount  of
resources that is likely to be transferred.  As such,  economic growth tends to increase the
number  of individuals  with negative  bequest  motives  and  also  increases  the  degree  to
which  individuals  are bequest constrained,  thus leading  to a  larger budget deficit under
majority rule.
b.  Cukierman  and Meltzer  argue that individuals  who  are below  a certain  level  of income
and  wealth  will  have  not  enough  resources  for  a  subsistence  level  of  lifetime
consumption.  As  such,  these individuals  would  tend to want their descendents  to  aid
them in achieving a higher level of lifetime consumption, thereby giving rise to negative
bequest motives.  Thus  a larger  fraction  of the population being poor,  or at least  under
that  certain  level of income  and wealth,  tends  to increase  the fraction  of the population
that are bequest-constrnined  and this consequently  leads to a larger budget deficit.
c.  As  argued  above, wage rates tend to  decrease with debt issuance.  As such, individuals
with labor  income as their main source  of income  will  tend not to favor a larger amount
of debt issuance, which is equivalent to a larger budget deficit.  Thus, a larger fraction of
the population that does not have wages  as their main  source of income tends to increase
the level of the deficit that preferred by the median voter.
14  Note that these conditions for  larger  deficits  are  not based  on rigorous  mathematical  derivation.  In fact,  they are
intuitive  implications  of the  comparative  statics  that were  derived  in their mathematical  model.  For example,  (e)
suggests  that  a higher  expected  longevity,  ceteris paribus,  tends  to increase the size of the budget  deficits.  However,
we note that differences in longevity  have not been incorporated into their two-period overlapping  generations  model.
'5 It will be explained below that with parts b and c of the Proposition, part d becomes  redundant.17
d.  Culierman  and  Meltzer  argue  that  individuals  with  extreme  amounts  of income  and
wealth  tend to  favor more debt  issuance.  Individuals  with low incomes will  tend to be
bequest constrained,  while individuals  with high  incomes tend to have  capital  income as
their main source of income.  Both of these groups of individuals  will vote for more debt
financing,  but for different  reasons.  Hence,  the larger the  spread of the distribution of
income or total wealth, the larger the probability of having a larger budget deficit.
Further, note that part d of the proposition is in fact a combination of parts b and
c.  Part  b accounts for the  individuals with very small  amounts of wealth  and income,
while part  c  accounts  for  individuals  with  very  large amounts  of wealth  and income.
Given this, parts  b and  c renders part d of the proposition redundant.  However,  suitable
cross-country  time series  data that measure  the aspects  of the population  mentioned  in
parts b and c is unavailable.  As such, data on income distribution,  relevant for part d of
the Proposition,  will be used in lieu of the unavailable  data for parts b and c.
e.  Higher  expected  longevity  tends  to increase  the expected  length  of time  an individual
spends in retirement'6. This tends to increase the required amount of resources necessary
to  sustain  consumption  in the retirement  years.  Thus  a higher expected  longevity  will
tend to increase the proportion  of the population who  prefer negative  bequests and also
the size of the negative  bequest that is preferred.  This, in turn, tends to lead to a larger
budget deficit, ceteris paribus.
In short, the Cukierman-Meltzer negative-bequest  motive theory of budget deficits can be
reworded  slightly as postulating that budgetary deficits  will be larger under majority rule,
i.  the larger  the expected long-run  growth rate of  the economy
ii.  the larger  the spread  of the income /distribution
iii.  the higher  the longevity
4.3  Previous  Tests  of the  Theory  of  the  Negative  Bequest
Motives
The theory of negative bequest motives is still largely untested.  To date, there has yet to
be an empirical test of the theory of negative bequest motives at the cross-country level.
For the United States,  Clingermayer (1991)  performed a test of the bequest motive model
using  U.S.  cross-state  data.  Using  a  simple  OLS  regression,  he  tests  the bequest-constrained18
hypothesis  using cross  section  data  on  long  term  debt financing  by the  American  states in  the
mid-1980s.
To  proxy  for  expectecl  economic  growth,  he  uses  two  measures:  (i)  the  number  of
employed persons in each  state:  in  1984 divided by the number employed in  1979,  and (ii) per
capita annual money  income in 1983  divided by per capita annual money  income  in  1979.  He
uses  the percentage  of the state's  population that is 65  and over as a proxy expected  longevity.
Two different dependent  variables were used: (i)  the average of per capita new net long term debt
(i.e., the new debt issued minus the amount of such debt retired)  divided by total tax revenues  for
three years (1985-87), and (ii) the average of new net long term debt per capita for 1985-87.
He finds that the elderly  share has a strong negative  effect on the two measures  of state
debt (as longevity increases, the amount of public debt decreases),  while the expected growth rate
variables have a statistically insignificant effect.
There are a few potential problems with Clingermayer's simple test of the bequest motive
theory.  Firstly,  his two measures of expected economic  growth  are too "short-run".  Recall  that
that the theory postulates that if the expected  growth rate is high, then the current generation will
expect  future  generations  to have  a  relatively  higher  standard  of living  and will  thus  favor  a
budget deficit.  As such, the measure of expected  economic growth should be a measure of long-
run economic  growth.  Next,  the regression  specification  ignores  the  bequest  motive theory's
postulation  that the spread  of the income distribution  affects the level  of public  debt or budget
deficit, which may lead to an ornitted variable bias.  Finally, the use of the elderly share to proxy
for longevity  is inappropriate  oni  two counts.  It is well known  in the demographic  literature  that
the decline  in the fertility rate, rather than the increase in the mortality rate, is the dominant cause
for population  aging.  As  such,  the  elderly  share  may have  increased  without  any  change  in
expected longevity.  Secondly,  a person living  10 years  past the age of 65, on average,  tends to
consume  the more resources  tham  10 persons surviving  up to 66 years  (one year past the age of
65).  The  reason  being  that  one's  consumption  of  resources  (especially  medical  resources)
increases rapidly as one advances in age.
5.  Other Variable<;  and the Budget Deficit
Before  an empirical  investigation  into the issue of whether bequest  constrained motives
are  significant  driving  forces  behind the  size  of a country's  budget  deficit  can  be  carried  out,
Thus the case in which higher longevity  increases the length of an individual's  working life is not considered.19
other structural  and political  variables that influence the size of the deficit must be first accounted
for.  There  are three other main classes of variables  that have been suggested in the literature to
have significant effects on the size of the budget deficit of a country.  They are
1.  structural variables that determine or reflect the level of efficiency  of the tax system in a
country,
2.  macroeconomic  variables, and
3.  political  variabbs representing  the level of political  instability  and political polarization
in a country.
5.1  The  Efficiency of the Tax System
The efficiency of the tax system has been emphasized by Edwards and  Tabellini (1991)
and Cukiernan et  al. (1992)  as  an important  determinant of the  size of the budget deficit.  They
noted  that  an  economy  with  an  inefficient  tax  system,  holding  other  factors  constant,  cannot
collect as large an amount of tax revenues  as an economy with an efficient tax system.  This is
primarily because an inefficient tax system has higher costs of tax collection and administration,
not  to  mention  more  widespread  tax  evasion.  Because  of this  lower  level  of tax  revenues,
economies with inefficient  tax systems tend to have larger (and more monetized)  budget deficits
as  compared  to  economies  with  efficient  tax  systems  for  any  given  level  of  government
expenditure.  The taxation capacity of a country is technologically  constrained by the structure of
its economy and its  stage of economic  development.  As such,  factors  influencing  the level  of
efficiency  of the  tax  system  in  a country  can be  grouped into  two  categories"7:  variables that
account for the sectoral  composition of GDP, and the stage of economic development.
The agricultural sector might be the hardest sector of the economy to tax.  Its typically
non-corporate  structure  facilitates  tax  evasion.  Therefore,  the  larger  the relative  size of the
agricultural sector in an economy,  the higher the costs of administration and enforcement of tax
collections will be.  This implies a less efficient tax system, thus leading to a larger budget deficit
for a given level of government  expenditures.
On the other hand, the manufacturing  sector is generally regarded  as one of the easiest to
tax.  This is because,  in sharp contrast  to the  agricultural  sector,  the manufacturing  industry is
largely corporate  in structure, making it less capable  of tax evasion.  Thus, when an economy has
a relatively  large  manufacturing  sector,  it should face  lower tax enforcement  costs implying a
more efficient tax system, and consequently it should have a smaller budget deficit.
17 See Cukierman et aL (1992) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991).20
A third  sectoral  share,  imports plus  exports as  a fraction of GDP, measures the foreign
trade sector of the economy.  Import and export taxes are commonly regarded as a cheap tax base
because they are relatively easy to assess and collect since such foreign traded commodities must
pass through  a limited number of frontier ports,  and are usually handled by a few wholesalers.
The  ease  of collecting  such  taxes  is  one  reason why  countries  with  extensive  foreign  trade
typically collect  a greater proportion  of public  revenues in the form of import and  export duties
than  countries  with  limited  external  trade  (Todaro,  1997).  As such,  an economy  with a larger
foreign sector, ceteris paribus, should be able to collect more tax revenue thus leading to a smaller
budget deficit.
Finally,  since tax collection  costs  are likely  to be  smaller  in urban  areas  than in rural
areas.  As  such,  the  higher  the  urban  population  share  out of the total  population  should be
negatively associated with the budget deficit.
5.2  Macroeconomic Variables
5.2.1  Level of Economic  Development
To  control  for  the  potential  effects  of  economic  development  on  the  cross-country
differences  in budget deficits,  several  different measures  of the level of per capita real  GDP will
be used.  Possible measures  include real GDP per capita-and a measure of potential  or trend real
GDP per capita.  Detailed description  of the construction of these variables  will be  given in the
relevant sections.
5.2.2  Accounting for Money  Creation
The  budget  deficit  can  be  defined  as the sum  of the different  ways  in which  it can be
financed.  Typically,  budget deficits can be financed  either by borrowing  from the public or by
seigniorage  18,  which implies that the budget deficit can be written  as:
18Note  that there are countries  for which the budget deficit is not equal to the sum of the debt issued or retired and  the
amount  of money  created.  For  example,  Singapore  has been  generally  running  budget  surpluses  since  the  1980s;
however, its stock of government debt: has been increasing.  This  implies that the Singapore  government has  chosen not
to pay off debts  that it owes to the public,  even  though it has the  surpluses to do so.  In fact,  it has chosen to borrow
even  more,  in spite  of accumulating  large  government  reserves  due  to  the  many  years  of budget  surpluses.  This
interesting case of Singapore,  which provides a contradiction  to the above "identity", illustrates  that it is not always the
case that when a country runs a budget surplus,  the  stock of national debt  should,  ceteris paribus, decrease  and vice
versa,  which  is clearly  assumed  by Cukierman  and  Meltzer  here  and by many  others  in  the literature.  The above
equation perhaps should be rewritten as:
Budget Deficit = Non-monetized Debt Issue + Money Creation  -Change in Government Assets
Changes  h  government  assets  were  not  controlled  for  due  to  a  lack  of available  data  and  because  changes  in
government assets is in many ways  similar to debt issue, within the framework of the negative  bequest motive  model.21
Budget Deficit  =  Non-monetized Debt Issue  +  Money Creation
The bequest motive theory of budget deficits  hinges wholly  on the assumption  that the deficit is
financed by public debt issuance.  Therefore, if a country runs a large budget deficit and finances
it by  monetizing  it, the  bequest motive  theory provides  no  explanation  as to  why the  budget
deficit  should arise.  This is because monetization of the deficit is equivalent to the imposition  of
an inflation tax, and this leads to a decrease in the real disposable income that should result in an
increase  the  degree  to  which  people  are  bequest-constrained.  Thus,  bequest-constrained
individuals would not favor an increase in the budget deficit that is financed by money creation.
As  such,  when  testing  the bequest  motive  theory  of budget  deficits,  it  is necessary  to
control  for  the  seigniorage-financed  portion  of  the  deficit,  leaving  the  component  of budget
deficit that has been financed by debt issuance  to be explained by bequest-constrained  motives'9.
Following Roubini  (1991),  I use the change  in the monetary base (as a share  of GDP) to control
for seigniorage revenue.
5.2.3  Accounting for Interest  Payments  on Government  Debt
Interest rates are an important factor in determining governments'  costs of debt servicing.
Naturally,  the costs of debt servicing become more important in countries that have a large stock
of government debt, such as Belgium, Ireland and Italy.  I will use the measure of the budgetary
costs of higher interest rates presented in Roubini and Sachs (1989b), which is the annual change
of  the difference between the real interest rate and the real growth rate, multiplied by lagged debt-
GDP ratio.
5.3  Political Instability
*  Political  instability has been  found  to play significant  roles in the determination  of the
size of the budget deficits20.
Bequest constrained  individuals  should be  indifferent between budget  deficits that are financed by public debt issue or
by sale of government assets, since in both cases current consumption increases at the expense of future generations.
'9Roubini and Sachs (1989a) showed that there is some evidence that policymakers treat seigniorage and bond issues  as
alternative ways to finance  a budget deficit.  Thus if some countries are constrained in their use of seigniorage taxation,
they  would switch to debt  issuance  to finance a given level  of level of budget  deficit.  It is clear that in such a case,
even  if the  budget  deficit  is  financed  by  public  debt  issue,  the  Cukierman-Meltzer  model  does  not  provide  an
explanation for such a component of the budget deficit.  Roubini and Sachs (I 989a) argue that due to their commitment
to peg to the Deutsche Mark, member countries  of the European  Monetary System (EMS)  experienced  a reduction  in
seigniorage  collections  as  they  induced  a  slowdown  in  inflation  and  they  found  evidence  that  the  decrease  in
seigniorage  financing was accompanied by a more rapid increase in public debt.
20  See Cukierman  et al.  (1992),  Edwards and Tabellini  (1991),  and Roubini  (1991).  These papers  actually  argue that
both political instability  and political polarization  are significant determinants of the size of budget deficits.  However,22
Edwards and Tabellini (1991) postulate that the more politically unstable a country is, the
larger  will  be its  budget  deficit.  Political  instability  will  raise  the  frequency  of government
changes  and  lower  the  likelihood  that  a  current policymaker  will  be  reelected.  Given this,
consider a policymaker who is required to choose both the intertemporal profile of spending and
taxes as well as how to allocate the resources  acquired by issuing debt.  Suppose that because of
political instability in the country, the policymaker is aware that in the future he may be replaced
by a policymaker  or political  majority  with different  preferences  about  some aspects  of fiscal
policy.  Then  he realizes  that,  whereas  he  is in control  of how to  allocate  the proceeds  of his
borrowing, the allocation of the burden of repaying  the debt  in the  future may not be under his
control.  This asymmetry  may prevent the current policymaker from  fully internalizing  the costs
of running  a deficit,  the more  so the greater  is the  difference  between  his preferences  and  the
expected  preferences  of the  future  majority.  In  simple  terms,  the  policymaker  may  wish  to
borrow in excess of the optimum and let his successors "pay the bills".  Thus, political instability
and polarization  tends  to  lead  to  a larger  than  optimal  size;of the budget  deficit,  even  if the
policymaker  and the voters are rational and forward-looking.
Cukierman et al. (1992)2'  provides an altemative  explanation of why political instability
tends to increase the size of a country budget deficit.  They postulate that the evolution of the tax
system  of a country  depends  not only  on its  economic  structure  but also on fie features  of its
political system, and that political instability tends to lead to an inefficient tax system.
Noting that an existing tax system  acts as a constraint  on the revenue-collecting  policies
and  hence  the  fiscal  policies  of the  current  government,  they argue  that tax reforms22 may be
strategically  determined:  a tal  system  may be designed  by taking  into account how well  it will
constrain the fiscal policies of future governments.  In particular,  a government may deliberately
refrain  from reforming an ineificient  tax system, for fear that a more efficient tax apparatus  will
be used  by future governments  to carry  out spending or redistributive programs that the current
government disapproves  of.  Since  government  changes  are more likely in countries  with more
it is noted that a country that is politically polarized may not be politically unstable.  For example,  a country can have
two very different or polarized  political ideologies  and yet be politically stable if the supporters of one of the political
ideology form  the vast majority  of the voter population,  assuming majority  rule.  For this reason  we have decided to
omit the concept of political  polarization  in our  presentation  of political  instability  as a  significant determinant of
budget deficits.
21Note that  Cukierman  et al. (1992)  found  that political  instability  and polarization  are significant  determinants  of
seigniorage  and not budget  deficits.  However,  their finding  is still relevant  to  this study for two  reasons. Firstly,
seigniorage  typically implies  a budget deficit exists  and secondly,  they argue that political  instability and polarization
in a country tends to lead to a more inefficient  tax system.  The  effect of the efficiency  of a tax system on the budget
deficit was discussed above.
'A  tax reform  is the  broad design  of a tax  system that determines  the available  tax bases  and  the technology  for
collecting taxes.23
unstable political  systems, such  countries tend to have  inefficient  tax systems and hence  larger
budget deficits.
This paper will use the frequency of government crises to proxy for political instability23.
The number of government crises is defined as the nunber of major government crises,  defined
as any rapidly developing  situation that threatens  to bring the downfall of the present regime  -
excluding situations of  revolt aimed at such overthrow.
5.4  Political Freedom
Recall  that  Cukierman  and Meltzer  rely on the  majority rule  or a democratic  political
system  for their theory of budget deficits.  Thus, it is important to control for time periods during
which citizens of a country may not have the political freedom to vote, such as when a country is
under a military dictatorship.
6.  Testing the Bequest Motive Theory and the Tax-
Smoothing  Approach to Budget Deficits
In this  section, I will  focus on the empirical  analysis of the bequest motive  and the tax-
smoothing theories  of budget deficits.  The sources  and definitions of the raw  data collected  for
the empirical exercise is first presented.  The description of the construction of the dependent and
explanatory  variables  used in  the regression  will  follow.  Finally,  the  empirical  results  of the
fixed-effects panel regressions  will be presented  with the interesting  implications highlighted.
6.1  Description of Data
The intended coverage of the regression  is from 1950  to  1995  and covers 87  countries.
The complete  list of countries is presented  in  the data appendix.  Table A. I presents  the sources
and definitions  of all raw data collected.
23  It  was  originally  intended to  follow Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1991)  and Roubini  (1991)  in  using the  frequency of
government  changes (both regular and irregular)  as a measure.of political instability.  However,  the data  series  for the
frequency of government changes or total executive transfers obtained from Taylor (1985) is short, ending in 1983.  As
such, the number of government  crises  is used  as a substitute.  This  alternative measure  is crude  since a government
crisis does not necessarily lead to a change in the government.  In addition, this measure excludes situations of revolt to
overthrow the government,  which should be included in a measure of political instability.24
6.2  Definition of V'ariables
Dependent  Variable
The fiscal surplus of the central government as a share of GDP in year t is defined as the ratio of
central government budget surplus or deficit (-) in year t to nominal GDP in year t.
Independent  Variables
Structural Regressors (Control Variables)
1.  Index ofpolitical rig!ts inyear  t.  The index runs from "1" to "7", with "1" denoting the
highest level political rights or most political freedom.
2.  Agricultural  share in year t = ratio of the value added in the agricultural  sector in year t
to nominal GDP in year t.
3.  Manufacturing  share in year t =ratio of the value added in the manufacturing  sector in
year t to nominal GDP in year t.
4.  Trade share in year t = ratio of the sum of imports and exports  in year t to nominal GDP
in year t.
5.  Urban  population  share in year t = ratio of urban population  in year t to total population
in year t
6.  Political  instability in year t = number of government crises in year t
7.  Development variable: per capita real GDP in year t
The measurement  of per capita real GDP needs to be comparable  across countries.  For
this reason, data for this variable  was obtained from the Heston-Summers  data set "Penn World
Tables  Mark  5.6"  (Heston  and Summers,  1991)24.  The measure of real  GDP used  in this paper
will be real GDP per capita measured in constant dollars that has been adjusted for changes in the
terms of trade, using  1985 international  prices for domestic absorption (consumption,  investment
and  government  purchases)  .md  current  international  prices  for  exports  and  imports.  This
measured was devised to take account of changes in the value of the country's output arising from
changes  in its terms of trade as well as changes in its production.  The domestic  absorption part is
calculated using 1985 international  prices.  However,  the net foreign  balance is valued in current
prices instead of 1985 prices.  This is to  allow for the part of the country's increased well being
that results form lower prices piaid for imports or higher prices received for exports.
24 The Penn World Tables display a set of national accounts economic time  series covering a large number of countries.
Its unique  feature  is  that  its expenditure  entries  are  denominated in  a common  set of prices  in  a common  currency so
that real international  quantity  comparisons can be  made  both countries and over  time.  For more information,  please
refer to Summers  and Heston (1991).25
8.  Seigniorage share in year t = the ratio of the difference  in the stock of reserve money
between year t and year t-1  to that of nominal GDP in year t.
9.  Measure of cost of debt servicing = annual change  of the difference  between the real
interest rate and  the real  GDP  growth rate, multiplied by lagged debt-GDP ratio, where
the real interest rate is defined as
Real Interest  Rate =  (1  + Deposit  Interest  Rate in year t) *  -1 -1 [  GDP Deflator  in yeart  j
Negative Bequest Motive Regressors
1.  Expected per capita  real GDP  growth rate of  the economy
Recall that Cukierman and Meltzer postulated  that as the expected real GDP growth rate
increases,  people  would tend to  expect  future  generations  to  have  a higher  standard  of living
relative  to the current generation.  Thus, this tends to increase  the share of bequest-constrained
individuals in the population.  In this light, expected per capita real GDP growth rate, rather than
the  expected  growth  rate  in  aggregate  GDP,  is more  intuitively  appealing  as  a proxy for the
expected welfare of future generations.  This was constructed as the slope coefficient of a "rolling
regression"  of the preceding  25 years'  log of the real  per capita GDP  on a time  trend.  More
specifically, the expected per capita real GDP growth rate of the economy in year t would be the
slope coefficient  obtained when  the log of real per capita GDP for the years  t-1 through  t-25 is
linearly regressed on a time trend25.
2.  The distribution  of  income or total wealth
A suitabb proxy for the spread  of the income  distribution is the Gini coefficient.  Data
for Gini  coefficients  are  from Deininger  and Squire  (1996) and only observations that are in the
"accepted"  category  are used.  Observations  in this category  are  considered  by Deininger and
Squire  to be relatively more consistent,  more accurately measured, and reliable.  However,  this
data set includes Gini coefficients  of different measures.  Two different measures are income and
expenditure  based Gini  coefficients.  Since individuals  are better able to smooth expenditure  as
opposed to income, Gini coefficients  based on expenditure measures are,  ceteris paribus, smaller
than those based on income.  Deininger and Squire note that the mean difference between the two
is about 6.6 out of 100, and recommend  adding the difference  of 6.6 between expenditure-based
25 The choice of using the past 25 years  is somewhat arbitrary.  Alternatives,  such as using data on the log of per capita
GDP of the past 15, 20 and 30 years,  will be presented in the sensitivity analyses in the appendix.26
and income based coefficients  to the expenditure based Gini  coefficients in the  sample 
26 to avoid
the exclusion of a substantial number of countries.  I follow their suggestion.
Another problem  wilh the  data set was that the  available  observations  were  irregularly
spaced  and relatively  scarce.  Note that the true gross income distributions  tend to change  very
slowly  and  that  there  will  be  unavoidable  inconsistencies  in  the  measurement  of the  Gini
coefficient,  (both  across countries  and across time).  In order  to minimize  the effect of extreme
observations  and to increase the number of annual observations, the available data were smoothed
using  locally  weighted  scatterplot  smoothing  (lowess)  and  then  linear  interpolation  was
performed  using  the  new  smoothed  observations27  The  "adjusted  and  smoothed"  Gini
coefficients  were then used in the regressions28.
3.  Expected longevity
The  bequest  motives  model  postulates  that the  longer  the period of time  an  individual
spends  in  retirement,  the  more  likely  he  or  she  is  likely  to  be  bequest-constrained.  The
Proposition  thus  indicates  that an  increase  in  expected  longevity  will  lead to  a larger budget
deficit, under majority rule.
In view of the above, a very appropriate  variable for use as a proxy for the expected time
an individual  expects to spend in retirement  is life expectancy at age  6529.  However,  across the
87 countries  included in the sample,  there  is a less than satisfactory number  of observations  for
life  expectancy  at  age  65.  'The problem  of insufficient  data  is  especially  severe  for the less
developed  countries,  with some of them  having as few as 3 observations  out of the possible  45
years of data.  On the other hand, data for life expectancy at birth is relatively more abundant with
annual  observations  being  available  even  for the  less  developed  countries.  Given  the  high
26 Such an adjustment, they argue, would be supported by the fact that the difference between income and expenditure
based Gini coefficient does not does not to seem to follow any distinguishing pattern,  except that it narrows over time.
Thus it is not significantly  correlated at the 5%  levels with levels of income,  continent  dummies or the average levels of
the Gini in the country but correlatedl negatively (with a correlated of  0.47) with time.
2"  The smoothed  values  are obtained  by  running  a  regression  of the original  Gini  coefficient  data  on time.  Each
smoothed  value of the Gini  coefficient  is generated  using  the original  Gini coefficient for that particular  year and a
small amount information  of the actual Gini  coefficients  observed in the past and future years.  In this method,  the
regression is weighted so that the contral point, the Gini coefficient in year t (giniD year,) gets the highest weight and
points  farther  away  (based  on  the  distance  |gini, - gini, Ireceive  less.  The  estimated regression  is  then used  to
predict the smoothed value  gini,  based  on ginit  only.  The  procedure  is repeated  to obtain the remaining smoothed
values,  which means a separated weighted regression  is estimated for every point in the data.  A bandwidth of 0.5 was
used,  which  implies that centered  subsets of 50 per cent of the observations  are used for calculating smoothed  values
for each point.  The greater the bandwidth, the greater the smoothing.
28 The results of  panel regressions in which the Gini coefficients are neither adjusted nor smoothed are presented in the
appendix for comparison.
29  The expected additional number of years a person is expected to live, given that he or she has survived until age 65.27
correlation between  life expectancy  at age 65  and life expectancy  at birth30, a simple  way to get
around  problem of having  insufficient  number of observations  for  "life  expectancy  at age 65"
would have been to use "life expectancy  at birth"  as  a proxy.  However,  in order to get a more
accurate  representation  of the  expected  time  an  individual  spends  in  retirement,  a less crude
technique was  used.  This technique  involves the use of the available  data on life expectancy  at
birth and at age 65 to make out of sample predictions for years in which data on life expectancy at
birth is available but life expectancy at age  65 is not.  For details, please refer to the construction
of Method 2 of estimating life expectancy  at age 65 in the appendix.
Tax-Smoothing Variables
Recall  that  the  tax  smoothing  approach  postulates  that  unanticipated  increases  in
government  expenditure  will  tend  increase  the  budget  deficit  (and  vice  versa),  while
unanticipated increases in output will tend decrease the budget deficit (and vice versa).  To obtain
a proxy  for  unanticipated  changes  in  per capita  real  government  expenditures,  I  shall  use  the




Gt  is the level of real per capita government expenditure  in year t
G.  is the expected  level of per capita real  government  expenditure  in year t constructed by
projecting  the  level  of per capita  real  government  expenditure  in  year  t-1  by using an
estimated  annual growth rate of per capita real  government expenditure.  The estimated
annual growth rate is the simple average  of the previous three annual growth rates of per
capita real government expenditure.
Similarly,  to  account  for  unanticipated  changes  in per  capita output  of the economy,  I
shall  use the percentage  deviation of the current level  of real per capita GDP from the expected
level of real per capita GDP or:
Y-  Yt
Yt
3 0 Based on the available 925 observations  of the two life expectancies that coincide  in terms of the country and year in
our data set, we obtained a correlation coefficient  of 0.8015.28
where
Y,  is the level of real per capita GDP in year t
Yt  is the expected  level of real per  capita GDP in year t constructed  by projecting  the level
of per capita real GDP' in year t-1  by using an estimated  annual growth rate of per capita
output.  The estimated  annual  growth rate  is  the OLS  slope  coefficient  is the  simple
average of the previous  three annual growth rates of the log of per capita real  GDP.
Some will undoubtedty  find the choice  of previous  4  years'  for estimating  the annual
growth rate of per capita real government expenditure  and output to be extremely arbitrary,  The
sensitivity analyses section  in the appendix presents regression results where alternative numbers
of years,  as well  as a  differenit method,  are used  to estimate  annual  growth rates  for  both tax-
smoothing variables32.
6.3  Fixed-Effects FPanel  Regressions
Panel regressions  were estimated for the period  1975 to  1992 and both country  and time
fixed effects were  used.  Annual  observations  were  used and  countries  did not have the  same
number  of observations33.  A lagged dependent  variable was include  as a regressor to reduce the
serial correlation of the error terms.
Missing Data Technique
A  major  problem  wilh  estimating  cross-country  regressions  that  use  socio-economic
variables  is a large number of missing observations.  In this case, data on the Gini coefficient and
life expectancy  at age  65  are  often  sparse  and  available  at irregular  intervals.  The  problem  is
exacerbated  by the  fact that it is usually the less developed countries  with the missing data for
these variables,  and it is the less developed countries  that are likely to exhibit bequest constrained
behavior.  Thus,  the  exclusion  of countries  due  to the  lack of socio-economic  (or any)  data is
likely to introduce a systematic bias against the existence of negative bequest motives.
3  Note that using the simple average (if  the previous 3 annual growth rates is  equivalent  to using 4  years of data.
32  Roubini  and Sachs  (1989a)  model unanticipated  changes in output for a country as  the deviation of actual output
from its average  value over the previous  three years in that country.  However,  note that since output usually has an
upward trend,  this method  will tend  have  an upward  bias in  unanticipated  increases  in output, since  the measure of
average value of output will consistently under-predict the true "expected  value".
33 In the jargon of panel data analysis, the panel is  "unbalanced".29
In an attempt to harvest all possible information  from the data set, a method developed by
Griliches  (1986) for the treatment  of missing data or observations  shall be  used.  Recall  that I
have been able to work around the problem of having  insufficient observations  for elderly  life
expectancy  by  obtaining  predicted  values  of  elderly  life  expectancy  by  using  data  on  life
expectancy at birth, which is highly correlated with elderly life expectancy.  Since a variable that
is highly correlated with the Gini coefficient is not available, this missing data technique has been
applied to the Gini coefficient.
The technique  involves  three  stages.  In the  first  stage,  the "normal"  estimation of the
fixed effects panel regression  with the dependent variable budget surplus share being regressed
on all independent  variables,  including the Gini coefficient, is estimated:
Stage 1 Regression
N
Y  3  = Po + ac 1 + a,  + PI3 1 l +  Y  J3"x,,t + Ed,  Vi,t
n=2
where
i  is the country index
t  is the year or time index
a0 is the country specific effect for country I
ay,  is the time specific effect for year t
Yi,1-l  is the budget surplus share lagged by one year
Xn  is the n
t
h explanatory variable.  The list of explanatory variables  is given in Table 6.1.
In  the  second  stage,  the  Gini  coefficient  is regressed  on all  of the  other independent
variables  used  in the  Stage  1 panel  regression  and  obtain  the  predicted  values  of the  Gini
coefficient from this regression:
Stage 2 Regression3 4
N-I
(Ginf),,  = yo + mca +,ur y,  Y,  X  + EY.Xw  + Eit  Vi,t
n=2
where
PO,  is the country specific effect for country I
4 Ut  is the time specific effect for year t
3 Note that the number of explanatory  variables only goes up to N-i  because the Gini coefficient is excluded.30
Using the predicted values of the Gini coefficient from the Stage 2 regression,  a new variable, say
"new Gin?', is generated.  This new Gini wil  take the original value of the  Gini if it is present,
and will take on the predicted  value if the actual  Gini value is missing".  This new Gini together
with the estimated coefficient of the Gini variable  from the Stage 1 regression is used to construct
a new measure of the dependent variable:
(New SuIplus  Share),,  = (Surplus  Share)i, - 1Gini(neW Gn  )it
Stage  3 of the missing data technique  involves the estimation of the regression with the
new  measure  of the  surplus  share  as  the  dependent  variable,  being  regressed  on  all  of the
independent variables, with the exception of the Gini coeffic ient:
Stage 3 Regression
N-l
(newY)i, = P3o +aci  + ay, + fY1j,,-j  +  f,nXn.,,  + e,,  Vi,t
n=2
The estimated  coefficients will be thus obtained from the Stage 3 Regression, with the exception
of the  Gini variable, which will be obtained from the Stage 1 Regression.  While this missing data
technique does not increase the efficiency of the estimated coefficient of the Gini variable,  it does
allow  the rest of the coefficients  to be  estimated more  efficiently  by increasing  the number  of
observations  being used  in the estimation36.
Table  6.1  presents  the  results  of the  panel  regressions  that  employ  the  missing  data
technique,  along with the results of the normal panel regressions for comparison.  Note that the
normal  panel  regressions  are  simply  the  Stage  1 regressions  of the  missing  data technique.
Standard errors  have been corrected  using White's  correction  for heteroscedasticity.  No formal
test  for  serial  correlation  has  been  conducted.  Recall  that  it  was  shown  in  Section  2  that
developed  and  developing  countries  exhibited  substantial  differences  in  their  budget  surplus
shares  trends.  Thus,  apart  from  Reg  1 and Reg  2, where  all  countries  were  included in the
estimation  sample,  the results  of the  separate  regressions  for developed  (Reg  la and 2a)  and
developing  countries  (Reg  lb and 2b) are also presented.  We see that in all three categories  of
countries,  the missing  data approach  substantially  increases the number of observations  used in
35 Note that the Stage I regression will generate  a predicted value of  the Gini coefficient for a certain country and year
so long as none of the other independent variables is missing for that country and year.
3 6 In order for the coefficients of the non-missing independent  variables to be estimated more efficiently, the probability
of the Gini  coefficient being missing must not be correlated  with the level  of the budget surplus  share.  I performed a
simple rank test where the mean of  the budget surplus shares for each of the 87 countries over the years  1975 to 1992 is
ranked.  By casual inspection,  we see no correlation between the countries with no Gini data and the level of the budget
surplus share.31
the  estimation,  this will lead  to an efficiency  increase of the estimated  coefficients of the non-
missing independent variables.
Tables  6.2a  and  6.2b  present  the  observations  actually  included  in  the  missing  data
technique  regressions for developed and developing  countries,  respectively.  Table 6.3 gives the
summary statistics of the variables used in the panel regressions.
Tax-Smoothing  Variables
Recall  that  the  tax  smoothing  approach  postulates  that  unanticipated  increases  in
government  expenditure  will  tend  decrease  the  budget  surplus  (and  vice  versa),  while
unanticipated  increases  in output  will tend increase  the budget surplus  (and vice versa).  Thus, a
negative  coefficient  will  be expected  for unanticipated  changes  in per capita  real  government
expenditures  and a positive  coefficient for unanticipated changes in per capita output.
Table  6.1  shows  that  both  tax-smoothing  variables  (variables  11  and  12)  are  of the
theoretically  expected  signs  and  are  statistically  significant  for  all  countries  (Reg  1) and
developing  countries  (Reg  lb).  For the developed  countries  (Reg  la), only  the coefficient  for
unanticipated  changes  in real per capita government  expenditure is statistically  significant.  The
statistical  insignificance  of the  unanticipated  changes  in real per capita  GDP  variable  for  the
developed  countries is again  exhibited by the results of the normal  panel regressions.  Thus, the
tax-smoothing behavior appears to be a significant factor in determining the levels of government
budget deficits for developing  but not for developed  countries.
Sensitivity  analyses, presented in the appendix, reiterates this point as they reveal that the
coefficient  for unanticipated  changes  in real  per capita  GDP of developed  countries  is always
statistically  insignificant.  On the other hand,  these sensitivity  analyses show that for developing
countries  the  coefficients  for  both  unanticipated  changes  in  per  capita  real  government
expenditure  and  output  are  always  highly  significant.  Thus,  it can  be  concluded  that the  tax-
smoothing behavior is important in developing  countries but not in developed  countries and this
finding is robust to various regression specifications.
The results for the industrialized  countries  are in accord with Roubini and Sachs (1989b).
Recall  from  Section  3  that  Roubini  and  Sachs  found  that  tax-smoothing  behavior  was  not
generally  evident  in  the  developed  countries.  Tax-smoothing  behavior  for budget  deficits  was
only found to be apparent  in the United States, United Kingdom and Finland.  On the other hand,
my  results  for  developing  countries  differ  from  that  of Roubini's  (1991)  finding  that  tax-
smoothing was not well  supported  by data from developing countries.  As mentioned  in Section
3, he found little evidence of an effect of shocks to output growth on the fiscal deficit.  However,32
it was argued that Roubini's use of the real GNP growth rate as a measure of cyclical  fluctuations
was inappropriate  because it is possible for high output growth to be experienced  even when the
economy  is well below potential  GDP, like  during the recovery phase of the business  cycle.  In
addition,  the  results  from  the  panel  regressions  here  should  provide  relatively  more  accurate
estimated coefficients than those from single country OLS regressions used by Roubini (1991).
Negative  Bequest MotiveD Variables
Recall  that  the  Cukierman-Meltzer  negative-bequest  motive  theory  of budget deficits
postulates that budgetary deficits will be larger under majority rule, the larger the expected long-
run growth rate of the economy,  the larger the spread of the income distribution and the higher
the  longevity.  Negative  signs  are  therefore  theoretically  expected  for  all  coefficients  of the
bequest motive  variables  (variables  13,  14  and  15),  when  the  dependent  variable  is the budget
surplus share.
Table  6.1 shows that the regressions  results for both developed  and developing countries
exhibit  some  support  for  the  theory  of negative  bequest  motives.  At  the  global  level,  the
coefficient of expected per capita  growth  rate is negative  but not significant.  When the separate
regressions  are estimated  for developed  and developing  countries,  negative  coefficients  for this
variable are also returned, but only that for the former is statistically significant.
With  regard  to  the  spread  of the  income  distribution,  which  is  proxied  by the  Gini
coefficient,  only  the  regression  for  the  developing  countries  return  a  coefficient  with  the
theoretically  postulated negative  sign.  This coefficient,  however,  is not statistically  significant.
Regressions  for all countries and developed countries have positive estimated coefficients for the
Gini coefficient,  both of which are statistically  insignificant.
Up  until  now,  we  have  seen  little  qualitative  difference  between  the  estimated
coefficients of the tax-smoothing  and bequest motive variables of the regressions that did and did
not employ the missing data technique.  The "contribution" of the missing data technique  is seen
when  we  examine  the  estimaited  coefficients  for the  life  expectancy  variable.  Although  the
coefficients  for the  life expectancy term are negative  but insignificant  for all countries  and the
developed  countries,  the  coefficient  for  developing  countries  is  negative  and  statistically
significant.
Another  interesting  observation  is  that  the  coefficient  for  political  rights  for  the
developed  countries  is positive  and  highly  statistically  significant.  Since  a small  value in the
index  implies  a high  level  of political  rights,  the  coefficient  implies  that  an  improvement  in
political rights to tends to increase the budget deficit share.  This suggests that the preferences  of33
the general public are important in the determination of the size of budget deficit, and thus lends
strong support to the theory of negative bequest motives.
Sensitivity analyses show the above results are generally robust to various specifications.
As will be shown  in the appendix,  variation in  the measures  of the Gini coefficients  used in the
panel regressions have little effect on the on the statistical significance of the bequest motives and
tax-smnoothing  variables.  Apart  from  the "adjusted  and  smoothed"  Gini  coefficients  described
earlier,  the panel regressions  were also estimated  with the Gini  coefficients were  no adjustment
was made  for the difference  between income and expenditure  based  Gini coefficients,  and  also
with Gini coefficients  that were adjusted but not smoothed.
Four proxies for expected longevity were used in the sensitivity analyses.  They were life
expectancy  at birth, life expectancy at age  65 and 2 different  sets of estimated life expectancy at
age 65.  While both sets of estimated  life expectancy at age 65 were  obtained by regressing  life
expectancy at age 65 againist life expectancy at birth, different specifications  were used.  The use
of life expectancy  at birth and the 2 estimated  life expectancies  at age 65 gave qualitatively  and
quantitatively similar regression results.  However, the use of the actual life expectancy  at age 65
as a proxy for  expected longevity  actually  gives very  strong  support for the  theory of negative
bequest  motives  for the developed  countries.  Unfortunately,  there  were  less than a satisfactory
number of observations  when  the same was attempted for the developing  countries.  In order to
maintain  the uniformity  of the variables  used for developed  and developing  countries,  estimated
life  expectancy  at age 65 generated by Method 2 was used.
Lastly,  specifications  in which the time period used in the construction  of the expected
growth  rate  variable  (Variable  13)  is  changed  was  estimated.  Time  periods  of  alternative
intervals of 15, 20 and 30 years were used.  Here  the sensitivity  analysis  shows  that the above
results are  somewhat  sensitive  to such variations  in the time periods.  The significant negative
coefficient  for the expected  growth rate variable  for the developed  countries,  and the significant
negative  coefficient  for  the  life  expectancy  variable  for  the developing  countries  are specials
cases  that  occur only  when  the  previous  25  years  is used  in  the  construction  of the  expected
growth  rate  variable.  However,  this  time  interval  was  chosen  for  constructing  the  expected
growth rate variable since  its specification  returns the highest R-squared  and adjusted R-squared
values,  as compared  to  the other  specifications  that  employ  altemative  time  period lengths  for
constructing the expected growth rate variable.34
6.4  Reconciling  the  Empirical  Results  with  the  Theory  of
Negative  Bequest Motives
At the first glance, it would seem that the theory of negative bequest motives is not well
supported  by  the  data.  However,  it is  possible to provide  an  explanation  for the  statistically
insignificant  coefficients of the expected  growth rate variable (for the developing  countries) that
is fully  consistent with the negative bequest motive of budget deficits.  Recall that Cukierman and
Meltzer  argue  that high  long run  real  per  capita  GDP  growth  rates  tend to  indicate  that future
generations  are  likely  to  be  better  off than  the  current  generation  and  thus  leading  to  larger
number  of bequest-constrained  individuals  within  the economy.  This "intergenerational  effect"
of high long-term  growth rates tends to decrease the budget surplus  share.
However,  it can be argued  that there  exists a second  side-effect of high long-run growth
rates (which has occurred),  which is to significantly raise the current standard of living, thereby
decreasing  the number of bequest constrained  individuals in the economy.  This "wealth effect"
will tend to increase the budget surplus share of the economy.  The resultant effect of high long-
term  economic  growth  rates  on  the  proportion  of  bequest-constrained  individuals  would  be
therefore  indeterminate.
For the  developed  countries,  the  expected  growth  rates  coefficients  are  negative  and
significant,  which  may  be  indicative  that  the  intergenerational  effect  of high  growth  rates  is
significantly  larger than the wealth effect.  On the other hand,  developing countries display  an
insignificant  expected  growth  rate  coefficient,  which  may  hint  that  the  magnitudes  of the
intergenerational  and wealth  effects  may be on  approximately par  with each  other.  Thus,  an
overall negligible  effect on the budget surplus share results.
A similar approach can be also used to explain the statistical insignificance of the elderly
life expectancy coefficient  for the developed countries.  Since life expectancy is another indicator
of  standard  of  living,  the  effects  of  an  increase  in  elderly  life  expectancy  can  be  again
decomposed  into two components.  Firstly, as argued by Cukierman  and Meltzer,  there exists a
"retirement"  effect  whereby  individuals  are  concemed  about  the  adequacy  of resources  for
consumption  during retirement.  This  effect tends  to  increase  the population  share  of bequest-
constrained individuals and is thereby expected  to lead to a decrease  in the budget surplus share.
However,  an increase in elderly life expectancy,  implies that individuals have had access to good
health care and  nutrition that are natural  by-products  of long-term  economic  growth and also a
higher  standard  of living.  As  such,  increases  in  elderly  life  expectancy  can  also  result  in  a
"wealth" effect, which leads to a smaller population share of bequest constrained  individuals, and35
hence  a  positive  effect  on  the  budget  surplus.  These  two  clashing  effects  can  result  in  a
statistically  insignificant  coefficient  for  elderly  life  expectancy  even  if the  theory  of negative
bequest  motives  were  to  hold.  The  insignificant  negative  coefficient  of the  life  expectancy
variable  for the developed  countries  can thus imply that the retirement  effect of about the same
magnitude  as the  wealth  effect of living  longer,  resulting  in an  negligible  effect on the budget
deficit.
For the Gini coefficient,  one possible reason for its lack of statistical insignificance  is that
the theory  of negative  bequest motives  is derived in  a closed economy  framework.  For small
open economies, interest rates will not increase  with the issue of public debt due to an inflow of
foreign capital.  As such,  individuals at the high end of the income  distribution,  who typically
derive much of their income from capital,  will not have an incentive to vote for more debt issue.
This  implies  that  for  small  open  economies  with  large  degrees  of income  inequality  may  not
experience  larger budget deficits.
A simple  test of this hypothesis is attempted:  the more open an economy is, the smaller
the magnitude of the (negative) partial effect of the Gini coefficient  on the budget surplus share.
Using trade share in GDP as a measure of openness,  a new variable is constructed by multiplying
our "adjusted  and  smoothed" Gini  coefficient  with the trade share.  The  coefficient of this new
interactive term can then be interpreted  as the partial effect of trade  share on the partial  effect of
the Gini coefficient on the budget surplus share.  Assuming the hypothesis is correct, an increase
in the trade share is expected to have positive effect on the partial  effect (making it less negative)
of the  Gini  coefficient  on  the budget  surplus  share.  The  coefficient  of this  interactive  term
between the Gini coefficient and the trade share is thus expected to be positive.
Table  6.4 presents the regression  results with  the inclusion of the  additional  interactive
term.  Note that I am unable to use the missing data technique with the inclusion of the interactive
term  between the Gini  and trade share,  and thus have reverted back  to using the "normal" panel
regressions  for this exercise.  Referring to regressions Reg 3a and 3b, we see that the coefficients
of the interactive term between the trade share  and the Gini coefficient (variable  15)  are indeed
positive.  However,  the  coefficients  are not  statistically  significant  for both the  developed and
developing countries.
One possible reason for the insignificance of the coefficient of the interactive term could
be the high  correlation between trade  share and the interactive  term.  Correlation matrices  show
that correlation to be 0.97 for developed countries and 0.99 for developing countries.  Hence, the
trade  share  variable  is  dropped  and  the  regressions  are  re-estimated  for  both  developed  and
developing  countries  (Reg 4a and  4b).  The  results show  that the coefficient  of the interactive36
term remains positive and tums significant for the developed countries but not for the developing
countries.  At the same time, the coefficient of the Gini variable  for the developed countries tums
negative but remains insignificant.
The regression  results show evidence to support  my hypothesis that the openness of the
economy  has a dampening  effect on the  negative influence of the Gini coefficient  on the  budget
surplus share, at least in the ca,se of the developed countries.  A potential problem with the above
test could be that the trade share  may not be the most appropriate  measure of openness  for the
testing of this hypothesis.  Given that I  am concemed with  the amount of capital inflow in the
event of an upward pressure  in the interest rate, a more  suitable measure of openness would be
the amount of capital inflow and outflow as a share of GDP.  Using this altemative measure  of
openness  could very well  result in stronger support for our Gini  dampening  hypothesis.  I will
pursue this altemative test at a later date.
6.5  Post Regressicin Analysis
To move  beyond  the statistical  significance  of coefficients,  one  wants  to know which
variables  can explain  a large  share of the observed  differences  in budget  deficits.  This section
weighs the explanatory  variables in terms of  their contribution in accounting  for actual changes  in
the budget surplus  shares.  That is, with "Surplus"  as  the share of central  govermment surplus  in
GDP and the Xl's as the vector of explanatory variables,  I  can explain  differences  in  surpluses
between two setting with this (lecomposition:
A  Surplus  Share  =  1,  ,  1 Xi  +  A prediction  error
Each (,AX 1 term is the difference  in surplus predicted,  or explained, by the differences  in the I4h
explanatory  variable.
6.5.1  Accounting for Differences  Over Time
The  accounting  of  intertemporal  differences  in  budget  deficits  will  be  conducted
separately for developed  (Table 6.5a) and developing countries (Table 6.5b).  For the two country
categories, the intertemporal accounting will be further broken into two parts, one for each of the
two time periods,  namely  1975  to  1983  and  1983 to  1992.  Recall  from Section 27 that during
these periods, developed  and developing  countries underwent  distinctly  different trends in their
budgets.
37 Insufficient  data prevented the inclusion of any analysis before  1975.37
Developed  Countries
Table  6.5a shows  changes  in the  budget surplus  that  are  due to actual  changes  in the
explanatory variables  used in the panel regressions  for the developed countries.  Column  (2) of
the table presents the actual changes in the average values of the explanatory  variables from 1975
to 1983.  For example, the change in the log of real GDP per capita is calculated as the difference
between  the  industrialized  country  average  the log  of real  GDP per  capita  in 1983  and  that in
1975.  Column (3) reproduces the estimated  coefficients  obtained from Reg I  a in Table 6.1.  The
fourth  column  shows  the  estimated  change  of the  budget  surplus  due  to  the  change  in  the
explanatory variable in that row.  It is derived as the product of the values in columns (2) and (3).
The derivation  of the actual  change in the budget surplus share  is identical  to that of the actual
changes in the explanatory variables.
The total estimated change in the budget surplus share is simply the sum of the estimated
changes in column (4).  The total effects for the tax-smoothing  and bequest motives variables are
the sum of the values in the respective rows in column (4).  The contribution of  the tax-smoothing
or bequest motives variables is the ratio of the respective  total effects to the actual change of the
global average  budget  surplus share.  Values  pertaining  to the period 1983  to 1992 are similarly
presented and calculated.  The estimated coefficients  from  Reg la are again used  for the  1983-
1992 time period and are presented  again in column (6).
First note that for both time periods,  the regression  specifications were  able to correctly
predict  that  average  developed  country  budget  surplus  share  would  decrease  in  the  1975-83
period and would increase  in the 1983-92  period.  For the period  1975 to  1983,  when the actual
average  industrialized  country budget surplus  share fell by  1.4 percentage  points, the regression
specification  predicted an estimate of a larger  decrease of 3.7 percentage  points.  For the period
1983  to 1992, the regression specification  made an over-prediction  an increase of 3.8 percentage
points,  relative to -the actual  increase  of 2.0 percentage points.  Thus, all explanatory  variables
togethef account for 255 percent  of the 1975-1983  dive into deficits,  and  193 percent of the 1983-
92  deficit reduction.  The control  variables,  those  that  are  neither  tax-smoothing  nor bequest
motives  variables,  explain  210 percent of the  1975-83  dive into deficits  and 216 percent of the
1983-1992  recovery from deficits.
For the  1975-83 period, of the two theories of budget deficits,  only the bequest motive
variables  correctly predicted that the budget surplus  share  would fall; together they account for
47.3  percent  of the  decline  in budget  surplus  share.  For  the  period  1983  to  1992,  the  tax
smoothing variables,  but not the  bequest motive  variables,  correctly predicted  that the average
developed country budget surplus would rise, accounting  for about 7 percent of the increase.38
Casual  inspection  of the  values  in  column  (4)  reveals  that  political  rights and  urban
population share were two contributing factors for the dive into large budget deficits in the 1973-
83 period.  An improvement in political rights can account for about 74 percent of the increase in
deficit share,  while  an increase  in the urban population share can account for  165 percent.  The
large role of political rights suggests that the preferences of the general public are important in the
deternination  of the  level  of budget  deficits,  and  thus  lending  support  to the negative  bequest
motives theory.
Another dominant factor of  the budget surplus share is the level of  per capita GDP.  From
the  table,  we see  that  increases  in  per capita  GDP  tends  to decrease  the budget  deficit  share
significantly.  This was the case  in both the  1975-83  and the  1983-92 time period.  However,  in
the  former  time  period,  the  positive  effect  of the  increase  in per  capita real  GDP  was  not
sufficiently large  to offset the negative  effects of the increase in political rights  and increase  in
urban  population  share, which  resulted  in  a large  decrease  in the budget  surplus  share  for the
developed  countries.  In contrast, the developed countries on average in the 1983-92 period did
not  experience  a large improvement  in political rights, but they did see a large  increase  in per
capita GDP that led to the large increase in budget surplus shares.
Developing  Countries
I  now  turn  to  determining  the economic  significance  of the  independent  variables  in
explaining  time series differences  of budget surplus shares of developing countries  (Table 6.5b).
The construction  of Table  6.5b is identical  to that of Table 6.5a.  The estimated coefficients  for
both time  periods  are obtained  from  Reg  lb in  Table  6.1.  Relative  to  that  of the  developed
countries,  the panel regression  was  able to provide slightly less accurate estimates of the change
in budget  surplus  share.  For  the period  1975  to  1983,  the actual  average  developing  country
budget  surplus  share  fell  by  2.4  percentage  points,  the  regression  specification  predicted  an
estimate  of a  decrease  of 1.5 percentage  points.  However,  for the period  1983  to  1992,  the
regression  specification  predicted  an  average  surplus  share  decrease  of 2.7  percentage  points,
when there was an actual increase of 2.5  percentage points.  The regression can thus account for
64  percent  of the  1975-1983  dive  into  deficits  and  -106  percent  of the  1983-1992  deficit
reduction.
The control variables  can account for 142 percent of the  1975-83  increase in deficits and
only  11 percent of the 1983-1992 recovery from the deficits trough.  Neither the tax smoothing or
bequest motive variables  were  able to  correctly predict  the budget  surplus share decrease  from
1975 to  1983 and the deficit reduction from  1983 to 1992.39
6.5.2  Accounting for Differences  Between  Developed  and  Developing
Countries
This section explores how well the bequest motives and tax-smoothing variables  account
for  differences  in  budget  surplus  shares  between  developed  and  developing  countries  at  two
arbitrarily selected points in time,  1975  and 1992.
Table  6.6  shows  the  differences  in  the  budget  surplus  shares  that  are  due  to  actual
differences  in  the  explanatory  variables  used  in  the  fixed-effects  panel  regressions.  Its
construction  is  identical  to  those of Table  6.5a and  6.5b,  with actual  differences between the
simple  average  values  of the  explanatory  variables  between  the  developed  and  developing
countries being presented  in columns (2)  and (5) instead of intertemporal  changes38. Columns (3)
and  (6)  reproduces  the  estimated  coefficients  from  regression  results  Reg  1.  The  fourth  and
seventh columns give the predicted effect on the budget surplus share due to the difference in the
explanatory  variable  in  that  row  and  are  derived  from  the  product  of the  entries  in  the  two
previous columns.  The actual  difference in the budget surplus share is the difference between the
simple  averages of the budget shares of developed  and developing  countries in  1975  and  1992.
Values  for the estimated  total difference  in budget surplus shares,  total effects and contributions
of the tax-smoothing and bequest motive variables are calculated as in Tables 6.5a and 6.5b.
We see that in 1975 and  1992 developed countries had budget surplus shares that were on
average  smaller  than the  developing  countries  by  1.8  and  1.4 percentage points,  respectively.
From Figure 2.3,  we know that both groups  were actually  running budget deficits in both years,
implying that the differences  in the average surplus shares should be interpreted as the developed
countries having larger deficit shares than that of developing  countries by 1.8 and  1.4 percentage
points.  The regression  specification,  however,  incorrectly predicted that the deficit  shares of the
developed countries to be smaller than that of the developing countries by 2.2 and 4.6 percentage
points in 1975 and  1992, respectively.
The tax-smoothing  variables together  also did not give correct  predictions  to the sign of
the difference  in  deficit shares  between the  two  groups  of countries.  They  predicted that  the
developed  countries  would  have  an average  deficit  share that was  smaller  than  the developing
countries by 0.03 percentage points in both 1975 and 0.03 percentage points in 1992.  In contrast,
the bequest  motive variables  were able to correctly predict that the  average deficit  share of the
developed  countries would  be  larger  than that of the  developing  countries  for both  1975  and
1992.  The bequest motive variables together accounted for  122 percent of the difference in  1975,
38 Columns  (2) and (5) is constructed as the average value of each explanatory  variable of the developed countries
minus the corresponding value of the developing countries.40
and nearly  186 percent of the difference  in  1992.  Although all three bequest motive variables
contributed  to  the  correct  predictions,  the  contribution  of the  life  expectancy  variable  was
particularly  large.  This life expectancy variable  could account for 74 percent and 129 percent of
the difference in average  surplus share between developed and developing countries  in 1975 and
1992, respectively.
Looking at the control variables,  we see that extremely large differences  in the log of  pre
capita real GDP  between the  developed and developing  countries were the rmin culprits for the
wrong predictions  of the regression  specification.  The difference  in the log of per capita real
GDP  alone  was responsible  for  the regression  to predict  that the  average  deficit  share  of the
developed  countries  would  be  smaller  than  that  of developing  countries  by  a  whopping  9
percentage  point  in  1975  and  11  percentage  points in  1992.  Differences  in urban population
shares  between  the  two  groups  of countries  had  also  predicted  that  the  deficit  shares  of the
developed  countries would  be  much larger  than that of the developing countries.  However,  the
large but opposite effect of the log of per capita real GDP variable more than offset the effect of
urban population  share variable, resulting in the wrong predictions of the regression in both years.
6.5.3  Accounting for Differences  Between  Individual Countries
In this third post regression analysis  section I attempt to determine how well the bequest
motives and tax-smoothing  variables can account for differences  in cross-country  budget surplus
shares.  First, a number of countries  are selected.  Then using actual differences in the values of
the explanatory variables between the selected countries and a pre-assigned benchmark  country in
a certain year, the contributions of the explanatory  variables in accounting  for the  cross-country
differences  in  budget  surplus  shares  were  derived.  The  selected  developed  countries  were
compared against the United States, while the selected  developing  countries compared to  South
Korea.  Comparisons  were  performed  for  the arbitrarily  selected  years  1980  and  1985.  The
results of which are presented  in Table  6.7a for the developed  countries and Table 6.7b for the
developing  countries.
Developed  Countries
Each  of the  rows  in  Table  6.7a  shows  the  product  of the  actual  difference  of  the
explanatory variable  in that 'row between the developed  country in that column and the United
States in  1980  or 1985, with the relevant regression  coefficient.  The regression  coefficients are
obtained  from Reg  la.  Values  for the estimated  total difference  in budget surplus  shares, total41
effects and contributions of the tax smoothing and bequest motive variables are calculated as  in
Table 6.6.
The  countries  were  selected  such  that in both  years,  two  countries  would have  budget
surplus shares that are smaller than that of the United States, while the other two countries would
have  surplus  shares  that  are  larger.  Apart  from  that  criterion,  the  countries  were  arbitrarily
selected.  We see that the regression specification tends to produce estimates that are generally  in
the same direction than the actual  differences of the budget surplus share between the selected
countries  and the United States.  Out of the eight comparisons,  only three predictions were in the
wrong  direction.  However,  it  is  also  noted  that  the  regression  tends  to  over-predict  the
differences in cross-country budget surplus shares.
Compared  to  entire  regression  specification,  both  negative  bequest  motive  and  tax-
smoothing variables do not perform as well in predicting the differences  in budget surplus shares
for developed  countries.  Out of the 8 countries,  the tax-smoothing variables together correctly
predict the sign of the difference of only 4 of them, and all of them account for less than 3 percent
of the actual  difference  in surplus shares.  The  bequest motive variables perform just as well by
correctly  predicting  the  signs  of 4  out  of  the  8 comparisons  with  the  United  States.  The
contributions  of the  bequest  motive  variables  to  the  correct  predictions  however  are  more
substantial  and range from 23 to 332 percent, with 3 of the contributions being below 42 percent.
Developing  Countries
I now turn to the  cross-country  comparisons  for the developing countries,  the results of
which are presented in Table 6.7b.  The  benchmark country is South Korea and other developing
countries were  selected such that there would be countries  with surplus shares  greater than and
less than that of South Korea for both years.
We see that the estimated regression  is able to correctly predict the direction of the cross-
country  differences  in  only 3 out 7 comparisons.  Relative  to the regression  specification,  the
negative  bequest  motives  and  tax-smoothing  variables are  a  little more accurate  in predicting
cross-country  differences.  For the tax-smoothing  variables,  4  out of 7 predictions  were correct,
with  3 of the  correct predictions  accounting  for less than  30 percent of the actual  difference  in
surplus shares.  The bequest-motive  variables  performed  again  equally  well,  with 4 out of 7
predictions  being  correct.  The  contribution  of the  bequest  motive  variables  to  the  correct
predictions  are  generally  even  less than  those of the  tax-smoothing variables,  with 3 of them
being less than 20 percent.42
7.  Conclusion
Cross-country  time  series  data  surprisingly  reveal  significant  variations  in  the  size of
central  government budget  deficits  over time.  The data also indicate  that there exist significant
differences  as  well  as  similarities  in  the  size  of  budget  deficits  across  countries.  These
observations  bring one to ask the question that is central to this paper: what determines the size of
deficits of national governments?
This paper focuses oni the factors explaining the differences in the size of budget deficits,
both over time as well as across countries.  Two prominent theories of budget deficits  are used in
this paper,  namely the Barro  (1979) tax-smoothing  approach  and the theory of negative bequest
motives advocated by Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) to explain the above-mentioned differences
in budget deficits.
The Cukierman-Meltzer  theory of negative bequest motives focuses the intergenerational
redistributive  aspect  of  budget  deficits.  They  argue  that  there  exists  bequest  constrained
individuals  who  would  favoc  larger budget  deficits  as  a means  for transferring resources  from
future  generations.  Cukierrnan  and  Meltzer  postulate  that  increases  in  the  expected  rate  of
economic  growth,  the  spread  of  the  income  distribution  or  expected  longevity  increases  the
population share of bequest-constrained individuals, and consequently,  resulting  in larger budget
deficits under majority rule.  In contrast,  the Barro tax-smoothing approach argues that the main
reason  for  running  budget  eleficits  and  surpluses  is  the  minimization  of the  deadweight  loss
associated with tax collection.  Barro shows that a constant average tax rate will minimize  the
deadweight loss.  As such, in the face of unanticipated  increases in government  expenditures,  the
budget deficit  is postulated  to increase,  while unanticipated  increases  in output are postulated  to
decrease it.
I  first  investigate  the  validity  of  the  bequest  motives  theory  and  the  tax-smoothing
approach  by  estimating  country  and  time  fixed-effects  panel  regressions  with  the  central
government  overall  budget  surplus  share  as  the  dependent  variable.  Variables  postulated  by
either theory are included  as independent variables, which allows to account for both time-series
and cross-country  differences  in the budget deficits and simultaneously  test to the validity of both
theories.
Fixed-effects panel  regressions, that employs a missing data technique, provide relatively
strong empirical evidence  that tax-smoothing  is a dominant motive  behind the running of budget
deficits  and  surpluses  by  centrai  governments  of developing  countries,  but  not  in  developed
countries.  In contrast,  empirfical  support for theory of negative  bequest motives is not as  strong.
First, the panel regressions do reveal that the expected growth rate exerts a negative effect on the43
budget  surplus share,  which is in accord with negative bequest motives.  However,  this effect  is
statistically  significant  only  for developed  countries  and not for  developing  countries.  For the
Gini  coefficient,  developed  countries  exhibit  a positive  but insignificant  coefficient,  while the
developing countries have an insignificant negative  coefficient.  Finally, the estimated coefficient
of the life expectancy variable is negative but significant for the developing countries but not for
'the developed countries.
In an attempt to  reconcile  the above results  with the bequest  motive theory,  it is argued
that there  are  associated  wealth  effects  that  Culderman  and Meltzer  have overlooked  in  their
model.  I postulate  that increases  in the expected  growth rate and  expected  longevity that may
have  the  "by  product"  effect  of decreasing  in  the  population  share  of bequest-constrained
individuals.  This may occur since increases in these variables indicate that the current generation
is relatively  better off than before both in termns of income  and standard of living.  An increase in
these variables  may result in two opposing effects on the population share of bequest-constrained
individuals,  with  the  net  effect  to  be  deternined  empirically.  Statistically  insignificant
cdefficients  for the bequest motive variables can therefore mean that the two opposing effects are
approximately equal  in magnitude.
A  possible  reason  for  the  insignificant  coefficient  of the  Gini  variable  is  the  closed
economy  framework of the  theory.  For small  open economies,  interest rates will not increase
with the issue of public debt due to an inflow of foreign capital.  Thus, individuals  at the high end
of the income  distribution, who typically derive much of their income  from capital, will not have
an incentive to vote for more debt issue.  This implies that for small open economies with large
degrees  of income  inequality  may not  experience  larger  budget  deficits.  A  simple  test  of this
hypothesis is performed by adding a regressor that is an interactive term between trade share and
the Gini coefficient.  I find some evidence that supports the hypothesis.
Post regression  analyses reveal that the both theories are generally weak in accounting for
intertemporal  changes in budget deficit shares  for both developed and developing countries.  The
theories  performed  significantly  better  in  accounting  for cross-section  differences.  Out of 15
cross-country comparisons,  each theory was able to make 8 correct  predictions  with regard the
sign of the difference between the budget surphas shares of the two countries at that point in time.
In  addition,  the  bequest  motive  variables  were  also  able  to  substantially  account  for  the
differences in the surplus shares of developed and developing countries.44
Policy Implications
Determining  the  factors  that  significantly  influence  the size  of the budget deficit  has
important  policy  implications  in the  area  of budget deficit  and  debt  reduction.  We  have  seen
evidence  indicating  that bequest  motive  variables  play  an important part in explaining  cross-
country  difference  in budget  deficits.  Given that the negative bequest motive theory hinges  on
the  existence  of bequest-constrained  individuals,  and  that poverty  should be a key factor  that
determines  the  population  share  of bequest  constrained  individuals,  I see the  above  results as
showing  strong  support  for reducing poverty  as the dominant  strategy for long-term government
budget deficit reduction.
In  this  light,  having  various  social programs  that tend  to  reduce  absolute  and  relative
poverty such  as unemployment  benefits,  assistance  to  low income  families  and public  pension
benefits  for the  elderly  are sound  starting  points  for a permanent  reduction  in the  deficit.  In
addition,  policies  that enhance  long-term  economic  growth  are  also  extremely  important since
economic  growth is also a key ingredient  in the poverty reduction recipe.  Governments  should
therefore not attempt to reduce the budget deficit by cutting down on government expenditures  on
infrastructure,  health  and  education  since  it  is  wel  documented  that  such  government
expenditures tend to increase  productivity and economic growth.  Also, countries should strife to
minimize political instability by having more stable governments  and also more equitable income
distributions.  Policies that are aimed at eradicating  corruption at all levels of government,  and
ensuring  officials  are properly-trained  and remunerated will  contribute  to establishing a capable
and  clean government that is likely to be more stable.  The resulting political stability will tend
increase  economic  growth, reduce  the  share  of bequest-constrained  individuals  and  leading  to
smaller budget  deficits.45
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Table 6.1
Testing Bequest Motives and Tax-Smoothing Approaches
Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share
=  Missita Data Tactioua  Norrnal
_  All  DeveloDsd  |Daveloninn  All  :  Deval ... d  DvlDn
Years: 1975-1992  Reg 1  Req  a  Real  a  Req2  Rea 2a  Rea2b
rnntmol Varinblal
1. Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.15922"  0.4137-  0.71 18***  0.8387-  0.6932"-  0.8202--
(D.071)  (0.134)  (0.083)  (0.073)  (0.078)  (0.12)
2.  Index of Political Rights  0.0011  0.0216-^  3.61E-05  0.006-  0.0144-  0.0036
(0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)
3.  Agricultural  Share (-)  -0.1115*  -0.1161  -0.091  -0.0287  -0.208  -0.0686
().064)  (0.278)  (0.073)  (0.089)  (0.331)  (0.125)
4.  Manufacturing Share (+)  -(1.0204  0.2808  -0.2193  -0.1961  0.1358  -0.2578
(0.169)  (0.212)  (0.213)  (0.191)  (0.15)  (0.24)
5.  Trade Share (+)  0.0319  -0.0108  0.0486-  0.0431  0.0675'  0.0337
(().022)  (0.053)  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.041)  (0.052)
6.  Urban Population  Share (+)  -0.0019---  -0.0149--  -0.0035-'  0.0013  -0.0125"-  -0.0002
(().001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)
7.  Log of percapita  Real GDP  0.0611'  0.2167'  0.0578'**  0.0448-  0.1451'**  0.0279
((0.017)  (0.047)  (0.017)  (0.026)  (0.041)  (0.032)
B.  Govemment Crises (-)  -0.0023*  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0021-  -0.0021  -0.0017
((1.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)
9.  Cost of Debt Servidng (-)  0.0159  0.0145  0.0109  0.0209  0.0572  0.0303
(C'.028)  (0.064)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.074)  (0.032)
10. Seigniorage (-)  -0.0866  -0.0985  -0.138'  -0.2125-  -0.1977  -0.214'
. ~~~~~~~~~~~(CA.0711  (0.102)  (0-081  (0.111  (0.157t  (0.1151 
T:ly -mr  -thlnp  VArinhircm
11.  Unantidpated changes  -0.0919"-  -0.04688  -0.0919-*  -0.1443-  -0.0843"-  -0.1484'
in real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.019)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.019)  (0.033)
(4 year, simple average)
12. UnantIcipated  changes  0.0917'  -0.0766  0.1069"-  0.0912-  0.0201  0.1111--
in per capita real GDP (+)  (0.022)  (0.053)  (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.049)  (0.05)
(4  year, simple averaalt
13. Expected per capita real  -0.2015  -0.7456-  -0.3773  -0.0521  -0.7806"  0.0979
GDP Growth  Rate (-)  (0.32)  (0.318)  (0.443)  (0.327)  (0.302)  (0.907)
(25 year constructon)
14. Gini Coefficient (-)  0.0004  0.0008  -0.0010  0.0004  0.0008  -0.001
(adjusted,  smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)
15. Life Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0067  -0.0119  -0.0232-  0.0054  -0.0042  -0.0094
(estimated by Method 2)  (0  006)  (0.0081  (0.0111  (0.0061  (0.006)  (0.021.
16. constant  -0.3339-  -1.0336-'  0.1347  -0.4854-  -0.5583  -0.0739
(0.153)  (0.379)  (0.173)  (0.186)  (0.39)  (0.456)
R-squared  0.8187  0.8699  0.8338  0.8651  0.9330  0.8565
AdJusted R-squared  0.7872  0.8392  0.7903  0.8329  0.9112  0.7919
F-Statistic  185.47  49.58  269.79  1002.91  845.70  3951.29
F-Stat  df 1  134  50  64  68  47  51
F-Stat df 2  495  212  252  302  148  122
Number of Countries  156  20  36  41  17  24
Number  of Observations  582  263  319  375  197  178
Standard  Errors are in  parentheses.
denotes signlflcance at  the 90,  95 and 99 percent  confidence level respecdvely
Robust standard errors obtained using White's  oo  rection for heterosoedasUdtv.51
Table 6.2a
Observations used for Developed Countries Panel Regression (Reg la)
Years  Total  no. of obs.
Countries  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  199:  foreachcoun
1 Australia  18
2 Austria  |  14
3 Belgium  18
4 Canada  16
5 Denmark  12
6 Finland  11
7 France  17
8 Greece  8
9 Iceland  17
10  Ireland  1  5
11 Italy.  114
12 Japan  18
13 Luxembourg  9
14 NewZealand  |  5
15  Norway  13
16  Spain  13
17  Sweden  18
18  Switzeriand  |  3
19  UnitndKingdom  18
20  UnitedStates  18
_Total no.  of obd  4
foreah  oer  8  10  11  11  13  15  15  17  16  17  18  17  16  16  16  17  16  1  263
Table 6.2b
Observations used for Developing Countries Panel Regression (Reg lb)
_  Years  Total no. of  obs.
Counties  1975  1976  1977 1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  198  1989  1990  1991  1992  for each  country
I  Barbados  5
2 Botswana  5
3 Brazil  7
4 Chad  3
5 Chte  5
6 CostaRica  10
7 Cyprus  18
8 Fiji  3
9 Ghana  9
10 Guatemala  7
11 Honduras  10
12  Indonesia  8
13  Kenya  5
14  Korea  14
15 Malaysia  13
16  Malta  |  6
17 MaurEius  11
18 Mexico  13
19  Morocco  12
20  Nepal  1
21  Nigeria  13
22  Papua New Guinea  8
23 Paraguay  2
24  Philippines  16
25 Seychelles  |  1
26  Singapore  8
27 Soulhia  15
28  Sri Lanka  14
29  Tanzania  4
30  Thaliand  15
31  Tunisia  |  4
32  Turkey  13
33  Urguay  16
34  Venezuela  1  3
35  Zambia  i9
36  Zimbabwe  13
Total no. of obs.
_foreachyear  3  3  5  9  12  15  16  17  19  18  28  29  28  25  24  22  24  22  31952
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics of Variables (1975-1992)
Variables  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Surplus Share  1436  -0.040  0.063  -0.451  0.687
ndex of Political Rights  1566  3.432  2.115  1.000  7.000
Agricultural Share  1507  0.156  0.128  0.002  0.690
anufacturng Share  1441  0.171  0.073  0.003  0.420
rrade Share  1525  0.554  0.414  0.044  3.702
Jrban  Population Share  1566  52.042  24.480  3.500  100.000
Log of per capita Real GDP  1482  8.163  0.976  5.694  9.976
Govemment  Crises  1503  0.457  1.094  0.000  7.000
oat of Debt Servicingi  783  -0.004  0.124  -1.575  1.133
eigniorage  1487  0.022  0.037  -0.080  0.493
nanticipated changes  1210  0.012  0.165  -0.815  2.232
n real per capita govt 3xp
nanticipated changes  1471  0.000  0.070  -0.338  0.538
n per capita real GDP
xpected per capita real  1194  0.027  0.017  -0.038  0.080
DP Growth Rate
ni Coefficient  818  41.442  8.901  21.472  63.430
irnectancv  Lonoevitv  . 1559  13.93  1.741  .350 
Developed Countrles
Surplus Share  395  -0.043  0.045  -0.233  0.105
ndex of Political Rights  396  1.141  0.461  1.000  5.000
Agricultural Share  381  0.054  0.034  0.011  0.165
anufacturing Share  373  0.207  0.055  0.030  0.341
Trade Share  396  0.547  0.316  0.132  1.732
Jrban Population Sha.e  396  73.569  14.627  27.660  98.720
og of per capita Real GDP  393  9.317  0.291  8.384  9.801
Govemment Crises  378  0.606  1.152  0.000  5.000
ost of Debt Servicing  296  0.001  0.017  -0.111  0.052
Selgniorage  387  0.009  0.016  -0.060  0.112
Jnanticipated  changes  388  0.002  0.073  .0.265  0.716
n real per capita govt '3xp
J nanticipated changes  393  -0.002  0.034  -0.183  0.107
n per capita real GDP
xpected per capita real  395  0.032  0.012  0.011  0.080
DP Growth  Rate
tnt  Coefficient  286  33.274  4.057  24.017  41.790
.xpectancv  Longevity  396  15.974  0.861  13.918  18.522
nQvaloping Couintries
urplus Share  1041  -0.039  0.069  -0.451  0.687
ndex of Political Right;  1170  4.208  1.881  1.000  7.000
gricultural Share  1126  0.190  0.129  0.002  0.690
anufacturing  Share  1068  0.158  0.075  0.003  0.420
rrade Share  1129  0.557  0.443  0.044  3.702
Urban Population Share  1170  44.756  22.801  3.500  100.000
Log of per capita Real GDP  1089  7.746  0.782  5.694  9.976
Government Crises  1125  0.407  1.070  0.000  7.000
ost of Debt Servicing  487  -0.007  0.157  -1.575  1.133
Selgniorage  1100  0.026  0.041  -0.080  0A93
Jnanticipated changes,  822  0.017  0.193  -0.815  2.232
n real per capita govt Oxp
Jnanticipated  changes,  1078  0.000  0.079  -0.338  0.538
n per capita real GDP
Expected  per capita real  799  0.024  0.019  -0.038  0.077
DP Growth Rate
il  Coefficient  532  45.834  7.604  21.472  63.430
xpectancy  Longevity  1163  13.306  1A14  9.350  16.93953
Table 6.4
Testing the Effect of Openness on the Gini Coefficient
Dependent Variable: Central Govemment Budget Surplus Share
DevelDed  Devlofin  I  Devlo2e  I  DeeoDn 
1975-1992  1975-1992  1975-1992  1975-1992
Years: 1972 -1992  Reg 3a  Rea 3b  Rea 4a  Rea 4b
Contnml Variahles
1. Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.6861-  0.8173*^^  0.6912-  0.8227^^^
(0.079)  (0.117)  (0.076)  (0.119)
2. Index of Politcal Rights  0.0155*^  0.0035  0.0149^  0.0036
(0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)
3. Agricultural  Share (-)  -0.2263  -0.0508  -0.2226  -0.0585
(0.334)  (0.127)  (0.332)  (0.127)
4. Manufacturing Share (+)  0.1393  -0.2571  0.1334  -0.2771
(0.148)  (0.231)  (0.148)  (0.24)
5. Trade Share (+)  -0.0669  -0.2756
(0.145)  (0.22)
6. Urban  Populabion  Share (+)  -0.0119*^*  -0.0003  -0.0122*^^  -0.0002
(0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)
7. Log of per capita Real GDP  0.1472^^  0.03  0.1463*^^  0.0254
(0.04)  (0.032)  (0.04)  (0.032)
8.  Govemment Crises (-)  -0.0017  -0.0028  -0.0019  -0.002
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
9.  Cost of Debt Servicing (-)  0.0473  0.0252  0.0507  0.0293
(0.078)  (0.031)  (0.076)  (0.031)
10. Seigniorage  (-)  -0.2023  -0.2028*  -0.1999  -0.2116*
(0.158)  I  (0129  (0.1571  (0.117)
Tax-Smoothing Variablws
11.  Unanticipated changes  -0.0824***  -0.1512^^  -0.0833-  -0.1472^*^
in real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.02)  (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.032)
(4 year, simple average)
12. Unanticipated changes  0.0181  0.1164^^  0.019  0.1091^
in per capita  real GDP  (+)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.049)  (0.051)
(4 year. simple average)
Bequest-Mobves Variables
13. Expected per capita real  -0.8066**^  0.1988  -0.7972*^^  0.1758
GDP Growth Rate (-)  (0.302)  (0.894)  (0.301)  (0.923)
(25 year construcbon)
14. Gini Coefficient (-)  -0.001  -0.0049  -0.0001  -0.0015
(adjusted, smoothed)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)
15. Trade Share  teracted.  0.004  0.007  . . - t  5.1  0025^:  .4  0 001.1
vwiLh  Gini(f).  - '.  ;(9.005)  :  .(0005)e  - . Kf  (0.  001)'  (0.01)
16.  Life Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0024  -0.0046  -0.0032  -0.0081
(estimated bv Method 2)  (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.006)  (0.021)
17. constant  -0.7079^  0.0806  -0.6907^  -0.0788
(0.397)  (0.446)  (0.392)  (0.45)
R-squared  0.9334  0.8606  0.9333  0.8575
Adjusted R-squared  0.9112  0.7961  0.9116  0.7933
Numberof Countries  17  24  17  24
Number of Observabons  197  178  197  178
Standard Errors are In  parentheses.
-,  - denotes  significance at the 90, 95 and 99  percent confidence level respectively
Robust standard errors obtained using White's correction for heteroscedasticity.54
Table 6.5a
Accounting lor Differences In Budget Surplus Shares of GDP
Changes Over Time, Average over Several Developed Countries
Actual  Estimated  Estimated Change In  Actual  EsUimated  Estimated Change In
Change  Coefficient  Surplus Share  Change  Coefficient  Surplus Share
19754i3  1975-92  1  975-83  1983-92  1975-92  1983-92
Explanatory Variables  (2)  (3)  (21 x (3) =  (41  (51  (I )  (5) x (6)  = (7)
tLMntro  VadaiheA
Lagged Dep Var  -0.04C9  0.4137  -0.016915  0.0245  0.4137  0.010154
Political Rights  -0.5000  0.0216  -0.010815  -0.0455  0.0216  -0.000983
Agricultural Share  -0.0162  -0.1161  0.001883  -0.0151  -0.1161  0.001755
Manufacturing Share  -0.0349  0.2808  -0.009799  -0.0212  0.2808  -0.005946
Trade Share  0.0619  -0.0108  -0.000669  -0.0628  -0.0108  0.000680
Urban Population  Share  1.6241  -0.0149  -0.024148  1.3264  -0.0149  -0.019721
Log of per capita  0.1331)  0.2167  0.029028  0.2540  0.2167  0.055058
Real GDP
No. of Govt Crises  -0.8095  -0.0005  0.000422  -0.2857  -0.0005  0.000149
Cost of Debt Servicing  0.0110  0.0145  0.000159  0.0059  0.0145  0.000085
Seignorage  -0.0015  -0.0985  0.000149  -0.0098  -0.0985  0.000966
Tax-Smoothing  Variables
Unanticipated changes  -0.1095  -0.0468  0.005126  0.0068  -0.0468  -0.000316
in real per capita govt exp
(4 year, simple average)
Unanticipated changes  0.0626  -0.0766  -0.004788  -0.0218  -0.0766  0.001671
in per capita real GDP
(4 year, simple average)
Rpnupmt  Mnt;VQR  VariahlPe
Expected per capita  -0.0051  -0.7456  0.003797  -0.0113  -0.7456  0.008431
Growth Rate
(25 previous years)
Gini Coefficient  -1.1825  0.0008  -0.000962  -2.1899  0.0008  -0.001782
(adjusted, smoothed)
Ufe  Expectancy  at age 65  0.8219  -0.0119  -0.009763  1.0493  -0.0119  -0.012465
(estimated  by Method 2)
Actual Change In  -0.01445  0.0195
Budget Surplus Share
Total  Estimated Change in  -0.0373  0.0377
Budget Surplus Share
Ratio of Estimated to Actual  254.73  193.28
Surplus Share (%)
Tax-Smoothing:  Total Effect  0.0003  0.0014
TS: Contributon  (%)  -2.31  6.94
Bequest Motives:  Total Effect  -0.0069  -0.0058
BM:  Contribution (%)  47.32  -29.7955
Table 6.5b
Accounting for Differences in Budget Surplus Shares of GDP
Changes Over Time, Average over Several Developing Countries
Actual  Estimated  Estmated Change in 1  Actual  Estimated  Estimated  Change in
Change  Coefficient  Surplus Share  Change  Coefficient  Surplus Share
1975-83  1975-92  1975-83  I  1983-92  1975-92  1983-92
xplanatory Variables  (2)  (3)  (2)  x (3) = (4)  (5) x (6) = (7)
Control  Variables
gged  Dep Var  -0.0385  0.7118  -0.027439  0.0296  0.7118  0.021060
olitical Rights  -0.4041  3.61 E-05  -0.000015  -0.4769  3.61 E-05  -0.000017
Agncultural Share  -0.0324  -0.0910  0.002952  -0.0196  -0.0910  0.001783
anufactuing Share  -0.0028  -0.2193  0.000605  0.0088  -0.2193  -0.001933
rade  Share  -0.0383  0.0486  -0.001861  0.0285  0.0486  0.001387
rban Population Share  4.7318  -0.0035  -0.016352  5.6314  -0.0035  -0.019460
og of per capita  0.1507  0.0578  0.008702  -0.0269  0.0578  -0.001552
eal GDP
No. of Govt Crises  -0.9558  -0.0005  0.000481  0.0000  -0.0005  0.000000
ost of Debt Servicing  -0.0350  0.0109  -0.000381  0.0266  0.0109  0.000289
eignorage  0.0016  -0.1380  -0.000218  -0.0097  -0.1380  0.001334
Tnx-S:mpnthin,  VAnrabins
nanticipated changes  -0.1728  -0.0919  0.015872  0.0893  -0.0919  -0.008201
n real per capita govt exp
4 year, simple average)
nantcipated changes  0.0159  0.1069  0.001697  0.0126  0.1069  0.001342
n per capita real GDP
(4 year, simple average)
Bequest Motives  Variables
xpected per capita  0.0065  -0.3773  -0.002434  -0.0128  -0.3773  0.004811
rowth Rate
25 previous years)
inl  Coefficient  0.0136  -0.0010  -0.000014  -0.0319  -0.0010  0.000032
(adjusted, smoothed)
ife Expectancy  at age 65  -0.1355  -0.0232  0.003146  1.1861  -0.0232  -0.027532
(estimated by Method 2)
ctual Change in  -0.0236  0.0252
udget Surplus Share
otal Estimated Change In  -0.0153  -0.0267
udget Surplus Share
ato of Estimated to Actual  64.55  -105.90
urplus Share (%)
rax-Smoothing:  Total Effect  0.0176  -0.0069
S  Contribution  (%)  -74.33  -27.25
equest Motives: Total  Effect  0.0007  -0.0227
M: Contribution (%)  -2.95  -90.1456
Table 6.6
Accounting for Differences in Budget Surplus Shares of GDP
Differences Between Developed and Developing Countries
1975  1992
Actual  Estimated  . Estimated Difference  Actual  Estmated  Estimated  Difference
Difference  Coefficient  in Surplus Share  Difference  Coefficient  in Surplus Share
Explanatory Variables  (2)  (3)  (2) x (3) =  (4)  (5)  (6)  (5)  x (6) = (7)
Cnntrnl Variables
agged Dep Var  0.0004  0.6922  0.000265  -0.0070  0.6922  -0.004842
olitical Rights  -3.0586  0.0011  -0.003234  -2.7231  0.0011  -0.002879
Agcultural Share  -0.1487  -0.1115  0.016587  -0.1280  -0.1115  0,014281
anufacturing  Share  0.0785  -0.0204  -0.001600  0.0164  -0.0204  -0.000334
rade Share  -0.0740  0.0319  -0.002358  -0.0652  0.0319  -0.002078
rban Population Share  32.2542  -0.0019  -0.060563  24.8515  -0.0019  -0.046649
og of per capita  1.5341  0.0611  0.093807  1.7983  0.0611  0.109959
eal GDP
o.  of Govt Crises  0.1131  -0.0023  -0.000259  -0.0264  -0.0023  0.000060
ost of Debt  Servicing  -0.0367  0.0159  -0.000584  -0.0114  0.0159  -0.000181
eignorage  -0.0132  -0.0866  0.001142  -0.0164  -0.0866  0.001422
Tax-saqttig  Vriables
Jnanticipated changes  -0.0223  -0.0919  0.002048  -0.0415  -0.0919  0.003814
n real  per capita govt exp
4 year, simple average)
nanticipated changes  -0.0194  0.0917  -0.001779  -0.0072  0.0917  -0.000656
n per capita real GDP
(4 year, simple average)
3eouest  Motives Variables
Expected  per capita  0.0169  -0.2015  -0.003409  0.0068  -0.2015  -0.001374
Growth Rate
(25 previous years)
Gini Coefficient  -12.01346  0.0004  -0.005228  -15.4187  0.0004  -0.006681
adjusted,  smoothed)
Life Expectancy at age 65  1.9509  -0.0067  -0.012989  2.7716  -0.0067  -0.018453
estimated by Method 2)
Actual Difference in  -0.0176  -0.0143
udget  Surplus Share
otal Estimated  Difference In  0.0218  0.0454
udget  Surplus Share
atio of Estimated  to Actual  -123.96  -318.06
urplus Share (%)
ax-Smoothing:  Total Effect  0.0003  0.0032
s  Contribution (%)  -1.53  -22.12
equest Motives:  Total Effect  -0.0216  -0.0265
M: Contribution (%)  122.71  185.6757
Table 6.7a
Accounting for Differences in Budget Surplus Shares of GDP
Differences Between Developed Countries
Estimated Effed on the Djffen  nce In  Budoet Surlus Shares
19-80  1  85
Difference between these  Italy  United  Australia  France  Belgium  Canada  Finland  Norway
countres and the U.S.  Kingdom  |  l
n  n t m=n=r i=h=  =  =
agged Dependent Variable  -0.0363  -0.0188  -0.0060  -0.0017  -0.0340  -0.0064  0.0164  0.0281
olitical Rights  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0216  0.0000
gricultural  Share  -0.0039  0.0007  -0.0033  -0.0021  -0.0002  -0.0010  -0.0061  -0.0011
anufacturing Share  0.0193  0.0063  -0.0058  0.0085  0.0060  -0.0073  0.0096  -0.0194
rade Share  -0.0024  -0.0027  -0.0011  -0.0022  -0.0130  -0.0038  -0.0039  -0.0046
rban Populaton Share  0.1056  -0.2238  -0.1787  0.0064  -0.3200  -0.0277  0.2183  0.0445
og Real GDP per capita  -0.0844  -0.0865  -0.0376  -0.0542  -0.0833  -0.0132  -0.0690  -0.0343
umber of Govt Crises  -0.0016  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0010  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
of Debt Servidng  -0.0003  0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0001
eignorage  -0.0015  0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0006  0.0006  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0001
rn-Sm4,nthl,q Vari,hl,
Jnanticipated  changes in real  0.0034  0.0013  0.0029  0.0021  0.0026  0.0034  0.0007  0.0009
er capita govt expenditures
(4 year,  simple average)
Jnanticipated  changes  -0.0048  -0.0003  -0.0050  -0.0017  0.0004  -0.0023  0.0004  -0.0001
n per capita real GDP
4 year, simple average)
Reuest  MOt;VQS Variables
xpected per capita Growth  Rate  -0.0145  0.0004  -0.0027  -0.0124  -0.0088  -0.0107  -0.0105  -0.0132
25 year construction)
ini Coefficient  -0.0009  -0.0090  0.0026  0.0003  -0.0086  -0.0048  -0.0065  -0.0041
adjusted,  smoothed)
e Expectancy at age 65  -0.0012  40.0005  -0.0039  -0.0029  -0.0037  -0.0123  0.0006  -0.0109
estimated  by Method  2)
etual  Difference  in the  -0.0714  -0.0217  0.0100  0.0240  -0.0595  -0.0083  0.0435  0.0852
Budget Surplus Share
rotal Estimated  Difference in  -0.0235  -0.3323  -0.2389  -0.0604  -0.4631  -0.0857  0.1713  -0.0141
Budget  Surplus Share
tio of Predicted to Actual  32.93  1529.81  -2399.36  -251.50  778.49  1029.74  393.47  -16.51
udget Surplus Share (%)
ax-Smoothing:  Total Effect  -0.0013  0.0011  -0.0021  0.0004  0.0030  0.0012  0.0011  0.0008
ax-Smoothing:  Contribution  (%)  1.87  -4.89  -21.20  1.76  -5.06  -13.96  2.47  0.95
equest Motives: Total Effect  -0.01659  -0.00911  -0.00396  -0.01495  -0.02109  -0.02769  -0.01639  -0.02827
equest Motives:  Contribution (%)  23.25  41.92  -39.80  -62.22  35.45  332.63  -37.66  -33.1758
Table 6.7b
Accounting for Differences in Budget Surplus Shares of GDP
Differences Between Developing  Countries
_ J  Estimated  Effect on the Difference  In  Budget Surplus Shares
1980  1985
Difference between these  Sri Lanka  Malaysia  Philippines  Brazil  Malaysia  Costa  Venezuala
countries and  South Korea  =  Rica
Control VariabIes
Lagged Dependent Variable  -0.0732  -0.0112  0.0112  -0.0265  -0.0346  0.0073  0.0319
Political Rights  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0001
Agricultural  Share  -0.0100  -0.0065  -0.0094  0.0018  -0.0062  -0.0058  0.0059
Manufacturing Share  0.0255  0.0167  0.0056  -0.0030  0.0238  0.0159  0.0145
Trade Share  0.0066  0.0163  -0.0099  -0.0229  0.0116  -0.0060  -0.0134
Urban Population Share  0.1220  0.0514  0.0670  -0.0201  0.0656  0.0691  -0.0588
Log Real GDP per capita  -0.0369  0.0130  -0.0287  -0.0028  -0.0010  -0.0162  0.0225
Number of Govt Crises  0.0025  0.0025  0.0025  0.0025  0.0025  0.0025  0.0025
Cost of Debt Servicing  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0014  0.0000  0.0001
Seignorage  -0.0031  -0.0034  -0.0019  -0.0036  -0.0011  -0.0068  -0.0004
Tax-Smoothing  Variables
Unanticipated  changes in real  -0.0084  -0.0335  -0.0188  -0.0285  -0.0040  0.0176  -0.0140
per capita govt expenditures
(4  year, simple average)
Unanticipated changes  0.0170  0.0198  0.0138  0.0091  -0.0088  0.0038  0.0034
in per capita real GDP
(4  year, simple average)
Renuest Motives Variahles
Expected  per capita Growth  Rate  0.0198  0.0073  0.0138  0.0102  0.0069  0.0178  0.0189
(25  year construclion)
Gini  Coefficient  -0.0057  -0.0130  -0.0099  -0.0227  -0.0135  -0.0097  -0.0096
(adjusted, smoothed)
Life Expectancy at age 65  -0.0052  -0.0001  0.0219  0.0172  -0.0009  -0.0333  -0.0050
(estimated by Method  2)
Actual Difference in the  -0.1604  -0.0472  0.0084  -0.1001  -0.0454  0.0205  0.0641
Budget  Surplus Share
Total Estimated  Difference in  0.0505  0.0592  0.0571  -0.0895  0.0417  0.0562  -0.0016
Budget Surplus Share
Ratio of Predicted to Actual  -31.45  -125.43  676.30  89.35  -91.79  274.85  -2.51
Budget Surplus Share (%)
Tax Smoothing: Total  Effect  0.0085  -0.0138  -0.0051  -0.0194  -0.0128  0.0214  -0.0107
TS  Contribution (%)  -5.32  29.17  -59.87  19.38  28.24  104.79  -16.65
Bequest Motives: Total Effect  0.00892  -0.00585  0.02578  0.00471  -0.00752  -0.02520  0.00428
BM  Contribution (%)  -5.56  12.40  305.31  -4.70  16.57  -123.19  6.6859
APPENDIX
Al.  List of Countries
The 87 countries included in the sample are:
Algeria, Argentina,  Australia,  Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,  Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Botswana,  Brazil,  Cameroon,  Canada,  Cape  Verde,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Chile,
Colombia,  Cote dlvoire,  Costa Rica,  Cyprus,  Denmark,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,
Fiji, Finland,  France,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Greece,  Guatemala,  Guinea, Honduras,  Hungary,  Iceland,
India, Indonesia,  Iran, Ireland,  Italy, Israel,  Jamaica, Japan,  Jordan, Kenya,  South Korea, Kuwait,
Luxembourg,  Malawi,  Malaysia,  Maldives,  Malta,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nepal,
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Oman,  Palistan,  Panama,  Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Romania,  Seychelles,  Singapore,  South  Africa,  South  Korea,
Spain,  Sri  Lanka,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Tanzania,  Thailand,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Great  Britain,
United States, Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Zambia, Zimbabwe
A2.  Sensitivity Analyses
In order to assess the robustness of our regression  results presented  in this paper, different
regression  specifications  were  estimated  as sensitivity  analyses.  These  specifications  differed
from one another in that different  construction methods or proxies  for were used for one or more
of  the independent variables.
A2.1  Various  Methods of Constructing Tax-Smoothing  Variables
Recall  that tax-smoothing  variables  are  constructed  as percentage  deviations  of current
levels of per capita  real  government  expenditure  or output  from their respective expected  levels.
The expected  level of per capita real output in year  t was constructed  by projecting the level per
capita output  in  year  t-1  one  year  forward,  using  the  simple  average  of the previous  3 years'
growth  rates  of per  capita  real  government  expenditure.  The  construction  of unanticipated
changes in per capita  real government expenditure  is identical.
Table Ala and Alb presents  the results of the regressions  where the number of previous
years used in obtaining the  average annual  growth  rate both tax-smoothing  variables is varied.
Table Ala presents  the results when the missing data technique  is used while Table Alb gives the
results of the normal fixed effects panel regressions.  Specification pairs Reg  1, 2 and 3 of both
tables use 4, 6 and 8 previous years respectively, to derive the annual growth rates.  Note that the60
use of the previous 4, 6 and 8 years is equivalent  to using the annual growth rates of previous 3, 5
and 7 years to obtain measures of the average growth rate.
Referring  to  Table  Ala,  we  see  that  regardless  of the  number  of years  used  in
constructing the average annual growth rates of the two tax-smoothing variables, the coefficients
of both tax-smoothing variables are alvays of the correct signs and significant at the 99 percent
confidence  level  for the developing  countries.  This is not so for the  developed countries.  For
these  countries,  while  the coefficient  for unanticipated  changes  in per capita real  government
expenditure  is  still  significant,  at  least  at  the  90  percent  confidence  level,  the  coefficient  for
unanticipated changes  in output is consistently insignificant.  A quick comparison with Table Alb
reveals  that  the  lack  of empirical  support  of the  tax-smoothing  hypothesis  in  the  developed
countries also holds when usinlg the normal panel regressions.
To provide  a further test of robustness, we estimate specifications that use an alternative
method of obtaining  expected  growth rates of per capita real government expenditure  and output
in Tables A2a and A2b.  The expected annual growth rates of both variables are now constructed
instead  using  the  OLS  slope  coefficients  obtained  when  the  log  value  of  the  variables  are
regressed  on time.  For exarnple,  the  expected  growth rate of per capita output is the resulting
slope  coefficient  when  log  of  per  capita  output  is regressed  on time.  The number  of previous
years to be used in estimating  the expected growth  rate remains  arbitrary.  Tables A2a and A2b
present  the regression results where the number  of previous years used  is varied.  Specification
pairs Reg 4, 5 and 6 uses 4, 6 and 8 previous years respectively,  to estimate the expected annual
growth rates.
We  see  that this  alternative  method of obtaining  expected  growth  ntes has little  or no
qualitative  effect on the results.  Regardless  of whether  the panel  regressions  employ  or do not
employ the missing  data technique, the results show that tax smoothing is evidenced  only in the
developing countries and not in the devebped  countries.
It is also noted  that the  coefficients  of the bequest motive  variables  are not too sensitive
to the method of constructing  the tax-smoothing  variables.  Focusing on the results of the missing
data technique regressions  in Table Ala and A2a, the 6 different methods of constructing  the tax-
smoothing variables result in the developed countries consistently  exhibiting the same qualitative
results.  Only the coefficients  of the expected growth rate and expected longevity variables return
the theoretically expected negative  sign, but only that of the former is statistically significant.  As
for the developing countries, the bequest motive  variables return coefficients that are all negative
Note that the use of the previous 4, 6 and 8 years  is equivalent to using information on the annual growth rates of
previous  3, 5 and 7 years to obtain a measure of an "average" growth rate.61
but  only  that  for  life  expectancy  at  65  is  statistically  sgnificant.  The  exception  is  when  8
previous years are used to construct the expected  growth rates of the tax-smoothing variables  (TS
MD Reg 3b and 6b).  The coefficient of the life expectancy  at 65 then becomes  insignificant but
remains negative.
The  above  has  shown  that  the  qualitative  results  of the  panel  regressions  are  largely
invariant  to different  construction methods  of the expected  growth rate  components of the tax-
smoothing variables.  Given the potential  volatility of budget balances,  the preferred number of
previous periods  is 4  years.  In addition,  given that  one  can  easily anticipate  objections  to the
validity  of regressions  that  utilize  only  4  observations,  the  4year  simple  average  method  of
constructing expected growth rates will be used for this paper.
A2.2  Variation in the Length  of Time Period used in the Construction
of Expected  Per-Capita  Real  GDP  Growth Rate
Using the "chosen"  4-year simple average annual growth rate method for constructing the
tax-smoothing  variables,  we now  look  at  specifications  using various  time  period  lengths  for
constructing  the  bequest  motive variable:  expected  per  capita  growth  rate.  These results  are
presented in Tables A3a  and A3b.  As above, the former table presents  the results  for the panel
regressions that use the missing data technique,  while the latter presents the results of the normal
panel regressions.
In BM MD Reg  la, lb and BM Reg  la,  lb each observation  for the expected per capita
real GDP growth rate is the slope coefficient obtained when the log values of real GDP per capita
of  the  previous  15  years  are  regressed  on  a  time  trend.  The  same  "rolling  regression"
methodology  is applied to  specification  pairs BM MD Reg  2, 3 and 4 except that real GDP per
capita for the previous 20 years, 25 years and 30 years were used respectively40.
The theory of negative bequest motives postulates that the higher the expected economic
growth rate, the higher the expected standard of living of the future generation.  This will tend to
increase the population share of bequest-constrained  individuals in the current generation, leading
to a larger budget deficit.  Since the purpose of this variable is to represent the expectations of the
current generation with regard to the standard of living of future generations, i is imperative that
a relatively  long-run measure  of the  growth  rate  is used.  For this  reason,  only  data from the
previous  15 years or longer were used.
40We were not able to extend beyond 30 years due to data constraints.62
Firstly,  note  that both  Tables  A3a  and A3b  again  illustrate  the robustness  of the  tax-
smoothing results obtained in the previous section.  We see that the statistical significance of the
tax-smoothing  variables  for  the  developing  countries  are  unaffected  by  the  variation  in  the
number of years used in the expected  growth rate  (bequest motive  variable)  construction.  Tax-
smoothing continues  to be evident among the developing  countries but not among the developed
countries.
We see that from Table A3a varying the number of years used in the construction of the
expected  growth  rate produces  substantial  qualitative  changes  on the coefficients of the bequest
motive  regressors.  It  is  true  that  all  coefficients  of the  bequest  motive  variables  return  the
theoretically postulated negative  sign, with the exception  being that of the Gini variable of the
developed  countries,  which  generally  returns  an  insignificant  positive  coefficient.  However,
these bequest motive  coefficients  generally  tend to be insignificant,  with a few exceptions.  For
the developed  countries,  the coefficient of the expected  growth rate variable  is significant only
when 25  previous years are used in the construction of the expected  growth rate variable  (BM
MD Reg  3a).  As for the developing  countries,  the expected growth rate variable  is significant
only for the 30-year construction (BM MD Reg 4b) and the life expectancy  variable is significant
for the 25-year and 30-year constructions (BM MD Reg 3b and 4b).
I argue that the insignificance  of the bequest motive variables for the shorter  15-year and
20-year  constructions  indicate that 15 or 20 years is not sufficiently long to accurately predict the
long-run expected  growth rate of the economy and consequently the standard of living of the next
generation.  On the other hand, using such a long period of 30 years would lead to some concem
as  it is  likely  to  render  the  measure  to be  very  insensitive  to recent  changes  in the  expected
growth ratesP.  In addition, we also note that the 25-year construction gives the highest R-squared
and adjusted R-squared relative to the rest of the specifications.  Based on the above, the 25-year
"rolling  regression"  is  the  preferred  method  for  the  construction  of the  expected  growth  rate
variable.
It can  be  seen  that  when  the  missing  data technique  is not  employed,  the  regression
results  differ  substantially  from  those when  the  missing data is employed.  In Table A3b,  the
developed  country  coefficient  for  the  expected  growth  rate  variable  is  consistently  highly
significant across the 4 different time interval  lengths used for the construction of the  expected
growth  rate  variable.  In  contrast,  the  other  bequest  motive  variables  remain  consistently
insignificant.  However,  the  missing  data  technique  allows  all  of the  independent  variables,63
excluding  the  Gini  coefficient,  to  be estimated  more  efficiently.  I  therefore  lblieve that the
coefficients  from  Table  A3b  are  less  accurately  measured  and  this  is  the  reason  for  the
inconsistencies between the results in the two tables.
A2.3  Different Measures  of the Gini Coefficient
The  theory of negative  bequest motives  postulates  that increases  in the  spread  of the
income  distribution  tends  to increase  the  proportion  of very  poor  people  at  one end  of the
distribution,  and capital owners at the other.  As such, increases  in the income distribution tend to
increase the budget deficit.  The Gini coefficient will be used as a measure of income distribution
and will be obtained  from the Deininger-Squire  data set.  Since it is very plausible that any true
income distribution  will change  very slowly over time,  all of the following  Gini  measures have
been linearly interpolated  against time to increase the number of observations.
Tables  A4a  and  A4b present the results when  different  measures of the  Gini are  used.
Specification pair 4 from both tables use the Gini coefficient in which no adjustment is made for
any  difference  between  income  and  expenditure  based Gini  coefficients.  Specification  pair  5
from both tables include  the adjustment  for differences  between  income  and expenditure  based
Ginis.  As suggested by Deininger and Squire, the mean difference  of 6.6 between the income and
expenditure  based Ginis is added to the  expenditure based Gini  coefficients  to make them more
comparable  to the income-based Gini coefficients.
In  order  to  minimize  the  effect  of extreme  observations,  the  arailable  adjusted  Gini
coefficient data were smoothed using  locally weighted  scatterplot  smoothing  (lowess)42 and the
panel  regressions  were  then  estimated  using  the  new  smoothed  Ginis.  The  results  of the
regressions using these "adjusted and smoothed"  Gini coefficients  are presented as Reg A6a and
A6b in both tables.
The results of the regressions  using the different measures of the Gini  coefficient reveal
that there are very little qualitative and quantitative differences  in the coefficients  of both the tax-
smoothing and bequest motive variables.  This is the case regardless of whether the missing data
technique  was  employed  or  not.  However,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  I  find  that  the
"adjusted  and smoothed"  Gini coefficient  is conceptually  most appealing,  and will serve as the
"chosen" measure of the spread of the income distribution.
41 While  it  is  true that the  expected  growth  rate  variable  is  focused  on capturing  the  effects of long-run  economic
growth  on the budget deficit,  we do not want to totally  exclude  the effects of short-run output fluctuations.  This is
because  such transitory fluctuations  are likely to have some effect on long -run expectations.
42 A bandwidth of  0.5 was used.64
A2.4  Different  Proxies for Expected  Longevity
According  to  the  negative  bequest  motive  theory,  increases  in  longevity  will  tend  to
increase the  amount of resources  required  for consumption.  This consequently  will increase the
population share of bequest-constrained  individuals, leading to a larger budget deficit.
Tables ASa  and A5b  present the regressions  results when  various proxies  for expected
longevity are used.  Life expectancy  at birth was used in specification  pair 8 in both tables  and
life expectancy  at 65 was used in specification pair 9 in both tables.  In addition,  in an attempt to
increase the number of observations for life expectancy  at age 65, we used two slightly different
methods of obtaining predicted values of life expectancy  at age 65 from data on life expectancy  at
birth.  In both tables, these  predicted  values  from Method  1 were  then used  in specification  pair
10, while predicted values from Method  2 were used in specification  pair 11.
Figure  Al  presents  the  locally  weighted  scatterplot  smoothing  (lowess)  plot  of  life
expectancy  at age  65 against  life expectancy  at birth for the years  1950 to  1997.  We see that
there  exists  a  distinct  break  in  the  relationship  between  the  two  life  expectancies  when  life
expectancy  at birth  is about  70 years.  StratifyIing  the data by decades  (Figures Ala to Ale),  we
see  that in every  decade  the relationship  between  the two  life  expectancies  very  similar:  it is
approximately  linear with a kink occurring at the point where life expectancy at birth is about  70
years.  Given  this,  two  linear relationships  between  the life expectancies  should to be estimated:
one if life expectancy  at birth  is less than  or equal to  70 years  and  another if life expectancy  is
greater than 70 years.  In addition,  since we expect medical  advances to influence the relationship
between  the  two  life expectancies,  the  data should  be  first stratified  by decades.  As such,  in
Method  I the data is first separated by decades and then by whether life expectancy at birth is less
than (or equal to) or greater than 70 years.  The predicted values of life expectancy at age 65 are
then obtained  by regressing  linearly  life  expectancy  at age  65  on life  expectancy at birth.  As a
result, a total  of 8  linear relationships  are  estimated,  the results of which are presented  in Table
A3.6a.  The  predicted  values43 of life  expectancy  at  age  65  obtained  are then  smoothed  and
linearly interpolated, before  they are used in regression  specification pair  10.
The second  method of obtaining  predicted  values  of life  expectancy  at  age  65  is very
similar.  For both  cases  of life expectancy  at birth  less  than  and  greater  than  70 years,  casual
inspection of Figures Ala through Ale reveals the possibility of a quadratic  relationship existing
between the two life expectancies.  Statistical tests show that there is little evidence of a quadratic
43 To account for possible discontinuities in the predicted  values of life expectancy at age 65, the predicted values were
first smoothed  using  lowess before they  were  used in the main budget  surplus share regressions.  A bandwidth  of 0.1
was used for the first 2 decades and a  bandwidth of 0.4 was used for the later 3 decades.65
relationship between the two life expectancies  when life expectancy  at birth is less than or equal
to 70 years44.  As for the case of when life expectancy at birth is greater than 70 years, statistically
significant quadratic  relationships were found for the periods 1980-89  and  1990-9745.  In addition,
tests of structural  breaks  were  conducted  at the  end of every  decade.  For the  case  when  life
expectancy  is equal to or less than 70 years, we found that there  exists  structural breaks  at the
years  1960,  1970,  1980  and  1990.  For the situation  when life  expectancy  at birth  exceeds  70
years, a structural break was found only at 1990.  As such, when life expectancy at birth is below
or equal  70 years,  I will estimate the values of life expectancy at 65 in same way as in Method 1.
When  life  expectancy  at birth exceeds  70  years,  I  estimate  a single  linear  relationship  for the
years  1950-79,  and quadratic  specifications  for  1980-89 and  1990-97.  The results are presented
in Table A6b.  The predicted values are then smoothed46 and linearly interpolated,  and then used
in specification pair  11.
We see that varying the various measures of expected longevity do not substantially  alter
the qualitative  and quantitative results of the panel regressions.  Regardless of using Method I or
2 for estimating life expectancy at age 65 from life expectancy at birth, we see that the qualitative
results of the tax-smoothing and bequest motive variables  still holds.
The only exception may be that of using life expectancy at age 65 (Reg 9a and 9b).  We
see  that for the  developed  countries,  in  addition  to the  significant  negative  wefficient of the
expected growth rate variable, the coefficient of the life expectancy variable remains negative but
becomes significant.  I take this as an indication that the estimates of life expectancy  at age  65
from  life  expectancy  at  birth are  still not  as  good  a proxy  of expected  longevity  as the  actual
values  of life  expectancy  at  65.  However,  while  there  are  sufficient  observations  of life
expectancy  at 65  to carry  out the  surplus  share  panel  regressions  for the developed  countries,
there are insufficient  observations  for the developing  countries.  To maintain  uniformity of the
independent variables  used in the panel regressions for developed  and developing  countries,  and
given the rather  "rigorous" Method 2 construction of estimated life expectancy at age 65, Method
2 is used as the measure of expected longevity for this paper.
44 The decade of 1960 to 1969 was the only decade to exhibit a significant coefficient for the square of  life expectancy
at birth.  From Figure Alb, it is difficult to identify an obvious quadratic relationship between the two life expectancies
when life expectancy at birth is less than 70 years.  As  such, we continue to assume  the linear specification between the
two life expectancies, as in Method 1.
45 We also attempted to fit a quadratic specification  for all observations  in a decade, that is, without the assumed
structural  break at the point when life expectancy at birth reaches  70 years.  However,  this resulted in non-monotonic
relationships  between  the two life expectancies.  At very low levels of life expectancy at birth, the estimated life
expectancies at age 65 would be relatively high.
46 To account for possible discontinuities  in the predicted values  of life expectancy at age 65, the predicted values were
first smoothed using lowess before they were used in the main panel regressions for budget surplus shares.66
Table Ala
Sensitivity Analysis: Tax Smoothing Variables (Simple Average Growth Rate)
Fixed (Country  8. Time)  Effects  Panel Regressions - Missing  Data Technique
Dependent Variable: Central  Government Budget Surplus Share
Number of Previous Years Used In  Constructinq SimDle Average Growth Rate
r'"'4ears-  "" ' ''  F6  ears  8  ears
''Deveoped''  , Developing..  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing
Years: 1975 -1992  bTSMD  1g1  TS MD Reg  2a  TS MD Re  2b  TS MD Reg  3a  TS MD  Rea 3b
Control Varlables  .
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.41:s7  0 7118  '  0.4235-  0.5954'-  0.4190^"  0.6523--
(0,134),  (0  083)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.137)  (0.099)
Index of Political Rights  0:021i6--i  3,  61 E-05 f  * 0.0219-  0.0016  0.0223-  0.0032-
(0.009).  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.01)  (0.002)
AgriculturalShare(-)  0 116i  i  0091  -0.0755  -0.0386  -0.082  -0.0666
(0 278)  ; Ai (0,073).  (0.286)  (0.088)  (0.293)  (0.096)
Manufacturing  Share (+.02808-,.  -02193  0.2636  -0.2029  0.2745  -0.1396
(0k2.12)  '  '  (0213)  ,  (0.217)  (0.217)  (0.214)  (0.169)
Trade Share (+)  -0.0108  00486'  ,,  -0.0089  0.0491"  -0.0071  0.033-
(0,053)  ,:  (0 025).  (0.054)  (0.024)  (0.055)  (0.017)
Urban  Population  Share (+)  0003  -0.0144-'  -0.003"'  -0.0138-  -0.0027..
(0-'004$).'  '  10.0'01)f061)  ..  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)
Log of per capita real GDP (+)  0.2167  - 0  *  ,  0.  2184-"  0.0602-  0.2243-  0.046...
(O  04  ),_  (0.017)  (0.051)  (0.019)  (0.051)  (0.016)
Govemment Crises  (-)  -0  0005  *.  -0 0005--,  v  .-0.0009  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.0002
(0  00'  (0002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Cost of Debt Servicing (-)  0.0145  00109  ,  0.0305  -0.001  0.0305  0.0097
(0 06'.)  (0 028).  (0.065)  (0.029)  (0.067)  (0.031)
Seigniorage (-)  -00985  -0.  138  m  -0.0771  -0.1556-  -0.0725  -0.1 515-
(01 0;  0  (  08)..  . (0.099)  (0.086)  (0.098)  (0.088)
Tax-Smoothing  VariahleA  -n
Unanticipated changes  -0 04685  , -00919"  ,  -- 0.0627  -0.0768'  -0.074"-  -0.1314..
In  real per capita govt  (0.02e8)  (0'i1)';'  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.039)
expenditure (-)  .2
Unantcipated changes  -0.0766 r . 0.1069  "'!  -0.0612  0.0846--  -0.0695  0.1217-'-
in per canota real GDP (+I  't.l  f  . D069)  02.03)  (0.0761  (0.035)
,  .=.,  :-,  ... , I4.,:....-, 
Bequest-Motives Variables  ."
Expected per capita real  -0 7456" - ,0.377i  ,  -0.7578--  -0.1925  -0.7312  -0.1138
GDP  Growth  Rate (-)  (0 318i  ( .443)  t0.34)  (0.447)  (0.382)  (0.442)
(25 year constructlon)  ."
Gini CoefficIent(-)  0 0008  0001  *  00011  o0.0008  0.0013  -0.0018
(adjusted,  smoothed)  (0.001  (0.003)  !  '  0.0011  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)
Life Expectancy at age 65 (-)  .0  i  -00232  -0.0101  -0.0227  -0.0095  -0.0155
(estrmated  by Method  2)  IQ8_: ;I  (012  (
constant  01.0336"-  0 1347  . -1.1116'  -. 0905  -1.2147"-  0.1069
(0  3791  . (0.173)  |  (0.417)  (0.134)  (0.431)  (0.191)
R-squared  0 8699  -:  0.  08338  0.8749  0.8281  0.8738  0.8510
Adjusted R-squared  0 8392  - 0 7903  - 0.8449  0.7818  0.8428  0.8092
F-Statistic  49 58  269.79  53.62  813.40  48.66  30.54
F-Stat  df 1  50':  . 64  50  63  50  63
F-Stat df2  212:  - 252  ..  208  241  204  288
Number of Countries  20  . 36  20  35  20  34
Number of Observations  263  . 3191  ''  259  307  255  293
Standard Errors are In parentheses.
*, -,  - denotes  significance at the 90,9S and 99 percent confidence level respectively
Robust standard  errors obtained using Whites corredion  for heteroscedasticty.67
Table A1b
Sensitivity Analysis: Tax Smoothing Variables (Simple Average Growth Rate)
Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Pinel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share
Number of Previous"  Yars Used  in Construction  Simnle Average  Growgth Rate
4 VgaJS  j  6 vears  8 years
Developed  Developing  Developed  I  Developing  Developed  Developing
Years: 1975 -1992  TS Req  1  TS Reci 1b  TS Rea 2a  I  TS Reg 2b  I  TS Rea 3a  TS Rea 3b
Cnntrnl Variahles
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.6932-  0.8202---  0.7371  0.8056  0.7217w  0.7874-
(0.078)  (0.12)  (0.078)  (0.111)  (0.075)  (0.114)
Index of  PoliRical Rights  0.0144-  0.0036  0.0146--  0.0015  0.0142-  0.0013
(0.007)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)
Agricultural Share (-)  -0.208  -0.0686  -0.2228  -0.0717  -0.209  -0.0858
(0.331)  (0.125)  (0.323)  (0.128)  (0.322)  (0.133)
Manufacturing  Share (+)  0.1358  40.2578  0.1154  -0.2702  0.1225  -0.2345
(0.15)  (0.24)  (0.146)  (0.212)  (0.148)  (0.212)
Trade  Share (+)  0.0675-  0.0337  0.0506  0.0231  0.0449  0.0287
(0.041)  (0.052)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.046)
Urban Population  Share (+)  -0.0125 - -0.0002  -0.011--  -0.0004  -0.0107-  -0.0005
(0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)
Log of per capita real GDP (+)  0.1451-  0.0279  0.1274-  0.0272  0.1255  0.0303
(0.041)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.031)
Govemment Crises (-)  -0.0021  -0.0017  -0.0026  -0.0017  -0.0031*-  -0.002
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
Cost of Debt Servicing (-)  0.0572  0.0303  0.0871  0.0204  0.09  0.0254
(0.074)  (0.032)  (0.074)  (0.027)  (0.072)  (0.033)
Selgniorage(-)  -0.1977  -0.214  -0.1744  -0.1344  -0.1677  -0.1795
(0.157)  (0.115)  (0.146)  (0.108)  (0.14)  .(0. "17)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
Unanticipated changes  40.0843-  -0.1484-  -0.111w  -0.1704-  -0.1219  -0.1717--
in  real  per capita govt  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.021)  (0.034)  (0.021)  (0.035)
expenditure (-)
Unanticipated changes  0.0201  0.1111--  0.0813  0.1276  0.0832  0.0968-
in Der capita real GDP (+)  (0.049)  (0.05)  (0.056)  (0.048)  (0.057)  (0.057)
Bequest-Mobves Variables
Expected percapita real  -0.7806 - 0.0979  40.6647-  0.1913  -0.5596--  0.1367
GDP Growth  Rate  (-)  (0.302)  (0.907)  (0.283)  (0.855)  (0.28)  (0.903)
(25 year construction)
Glnl  Coefficient (-)  0.0008  -0.001  0.0011  -0.0008  0.0013  -0.0018
(adjusted, smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.00 1)  (0.003)
Life Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0042  -0.0094  -0.0021  -0.0016  -0.0021  -0.0121
(estimated  by Method 2)  to.006)  (0.021)  (0.005I  (0.0191  (0.0051  (0-021)
constant  -0.5583  -0.0739  -0.5259  -0.1483  -0.2184  0.0473
(0.39)  (0.456)  (0.391)  (0.448)  (0.479)  (0.361)
R-squared  0.9330  0.8565  0.9375  0.8726  0.9395  0.8722
Adjusted R-squared  0.9112  0.7919  0.9169  0.8147  0.9194  0.8136
F-Statistic  845.70  3951.29  920.78  2285.78  1063.50  2086.77
F-Stat  df 1  47  51  47  50  47  50
F-Stat  df 2  148  122  146  121  144  120
Number of Countries  17  24  17  24  17  24
Numberof Observations  197  178  195  177  193  176
Standard Errors are In  parentheses.
1,  ,  denotes significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence  level respectivety
Robust standard errors obtained using Whites correction for heteroscdastidty.68
Table A2a
Sensitivity Analysis: Tax Smoothing Variables (OLS Estimated Growth Rate)
Fixed (Country & Time)  Effects Panel Regressions - Missing Data Technique
Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share
Number of Previous Years Used In Estimatinc  Growth Rate
4vears  6  6ears  J  8  ears
Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing
Years: 1972 -1992  TS MDR  4a  TS MD  Rea 4b  TS MD Rea 5a  TS MD Reg 5  TS MD Reg 6a  TS MD  Reg 6b
Control Variables
Dependent  Variable Lag  1  0.4173--  0.6695...  0.4229'  0.5920"  0.4203--  0.6511--'
(0.133)  (0.083)  (0.141)  (0.089)  (0.138)  (0.096)
Index of Political Rights  0.0:216"  0.0003  0.0218-  0.0013  0.0228-  0.0031'
(0.(109)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)
Agricultural  Share (-)  -0.109  -0.0871  -0.0741  -0.0374  -0.0772  -0.0687
(0.277)  (0.077)  (0.281)  (0.087)  (0.286)  (0.095)
Manufacturing  Share (+)  0.2781  -0.2179  0.2636  -0.1917  0.2769  -0.135
(0.212)  (0.218)  (0.217)  (0.213)  (0.215)  (0.165)
Trade Share  (+)  -0.0109  0.0497-  -0.0087  0.0495"  -0.0073  0.032
(0.053)  (0.025)  (0.054)  (0.024)  (0.055)  (0.017)
Urban Population  Share (+)  -0.0148-  -0.0035-  -0.0144"'  -0.0031-  -0.0138"  -0.0027.-
(0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)
Log of per capita real GDP (+)  0.2166...  0.0614--  0.2191"  0.0615'  0.2264'  0.0467--
(0.047)  (0.018)  (0.051)  (0.019)  (0.051)  (0.015)
Govemment Crises (-)  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0009  -0.0002  -0.001  -0.0003
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)
Cost of Debt Servicing (-)  0.0194  0.007  0.0307  -0.0055  0.029  0.0074
(0.054)  (0.028)  (0.063)  (0.028)  (0.064)  (0.029)
Seigniorage (-)  -0.0962  -0.1352  -0.0735  -0.1664'  -0.0672  -0.1458*
_________  __  (0.102)  (0.082)  (0.098)  (0.085)  - (0.096)  (0.086)
Tax-Smoothing  Vnnahles
Unanticipated changes  -.00i00  -0.0833"'  -0.0659-  -0.0752-  -0.0792-  -0.1341...
In real per capita govt  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.038)
expenditure (-)
Unanticipated changes  -0.0731  0.0959---  -0.0656  0.0794"  -0.0723  0.1175--
n  oer caoita real GDP (+\  (O) L..  (0-026)  to  lg  Ia0.0281  (0.0741  (0-034
Bequest-Motives Variables
Expected per capita real  -0.7423-  -0.3809  -0.758"  -0.2311  40.7239'  -0.1311
GDP Growth  Rate  (-)  (0.318)  (0.448)  (0.339)  (0.44)  (0.381)  (0.433)
(25  year construction)
Gini Coefficient (-)  0.0008  -0.001  0.0011  -0.0008  0.0012  -0.0018
(adjusted, smoothed)  (0.00 1)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)
LIfe Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0118  -0.0242"  -0.0101  -0.0232'  -0.0091  -0.0142
jestimated by Method 21  (0-008)  (0.011  ( 0091  (0.012)  (0.008  (0.01)
constant  -1.0355--  0.1182  -1.114'  -0.0937  -1.2382"  0.0754
(0.379)  (0.175)  (0.418)  (0.133)  (0.431)  (0.188)
R-squared  0.87(11  0.8283  0.8755  0.8295  0.8745  0.8529
Adjusted R-squared  0.839l5  0.7834  0.8458  0.7836  0.8438  0.8117
F-Statistic  50.84  110.40  54.31  574.63  50.28  29.83
F-Stat  df 1  50  64  50  63  50  63
F-Stat df 2  212  252  208  241  204  288
Number of Countries  20  36  20  35  20  34
lNumber of  Observatlons  263  319  259  307  255  293
Standard Errors are In  parentheses.
"  *- denotes signircance  at the 90. 95 and 119  percent confidence level respectivelY
Robust standard errors  obtained using White's correcton for heteroseedaslclty.69
Table A2b
Sensitivity Analysis: Tax Smoothing Variables (OLS Estimated  Growth Rate)
Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share
Numher of Previous Years Used in Estimatinn  rowth Rate
4 v  1rs  6 years  8 vears
Developed  Developing  Developed  |  Developing  Developed  |  Developing
Years: 1972 -1992  TS Re  4a  TS Rea 4b  TS Re  Sa  I  TS Rea Sb  TS Rea 6a  I  TS Rea 6b
Controlm  Variale
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.6936*^^  0.8053...  0.7342-  0.7986w^  0.7245  0.7747*^^
(0.078)  (0.123)  (0.078)  (0.108)  (0.075)  (0.11)
Index of Political Rights  0.0146^  0.0038  0.0149^  0.001  0.0151*^  0.001
(0.007)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)
Agricultural Share(-)  -0.2015  -0.0516  -0.2412  -0.0641  -0.2152  -0.083
(0.328)  (0.123)  (0.315)  (0.125)  (0.312)  (0.13)
Manufactunng  Share (+)  0.1355  -0.2617  0.1212  -0.2401  0.1257  -0.2377
(0.15)  (0.24)  (0.147)  (0.2)  (0.148)  (0.207)
Trade  Share (+)  0.0677^  0.0361  0.0521  0.0221  0.0412  0.0266
(0.04)  (0.053)  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.046)
Urban Population Share (+)  -0.0125..  -0.0001  -0.011^^  -0.0004  -0.0106-  -0.0004
(0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)
Log of per capita real GDP (+)  0.1464^^  0.0314  0.1303^^  0.0285  0.1274-  0.0339
(0.041)  (0.032)  (0.04)  (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.031)
Govemment Crises (-)  -0.002  -0.0016  -0.0025^  -0.0016  -0.003-  -0.0023
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
Cost of Debt  Servicing (-)  0.0572  0.0269  0.0724  0.0132  0.077  0.0228
(0.074)  (0.031)  (0.073)  (0.027)  (0.071)  (0.03)
Seigniorage(-)  -0.1963  -0.2222^  -0.1714  -0.1601  -0.1627  -0.173
(0.157)  (0.118)  (0.144)  (0.105)  (0.137)  (0.112)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
Unantclpated changes  -0.0856*^^  -0.1433...  -0.1124^^  -0.1686  -0.124...  -0.1713-
in real per capita govt  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.021)  (0.032)  (0.02)  (0.034)
expenditure (-)
Unanticipated changes  0.0186  0.1004-  0.065  0.1157-^  0.076  0.0964
In  per capita real GDP (+)  (0.049)  (0.05)  (0.053)  (0.047)  (0.056)  l0.054)
Bequest-Motives Variables
Expected per capita real  -0.7733^  0.1073  -0.6655^  0.1563  -0.5674^  0.1407
GDP Grwth Rate (-)  (0.300)  (0.915)  (0.283)  (0.828)  (0.279)  (0.871)
(25 year construcion)
Gini Coefficient (-)  0.0008  -0.001  0.0011  -0.0008  0.0012  -0.0018
(adjusted, smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)
Life Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0043  -0.0106  -0.0023  -0.0032  -0.0021  -0.0098
(estmated  by Method  21  0.006)  (  1  (0  005  (0Q019)  (0.0051  .0.02L
constant  -0.5698  -0.1102  -0.5471  -0.1340  -0.2416  -0.0025
(0.389)  (0.456)  (0.388)  (0.438)  (0.475)  (0.353)
R-squared  0.9334  0.8550  0.9377  0.8769  0.9403  0.8745
Adjusted  R-squared  0.9118  0.7896  0.9172  0.8210  0.9204  0.8170
F-StatisUc  844.39  2036.49  947.76  2269.98  1283.22  2103.26
F-Stat  df 1  47  50  47  50  47  50
F-Stat df 2  148  122  146  121  144  120
Number of Countries  17  24  17  24  17  24
lNumber of Observations  197  178  195  177  193  176
Standard Errors are in  parentheses.
^ ^- - denotes significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence level respectvely
Robust standard errors obtained using WhiieWs  correction for heteroscedasticity.70
Table A3a
Sensitivity Analysis: Expected  Per Capita Growth Rate
Fixed  (Country &  Time) Effects Panel Regressions - Missing Data Technique
Dependiunt Variable: Central Govemment Budget Surplus Share
iExpected growth rate constructed usn  previous
15,  ars  1  20 vears  T  30 veas
Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  JpDie'i6i  |ed veiong  Developed  Developing
Years  1975 -1992  BM  MD  isa  mMDRc2J8M  O  3eB'MRb  MRo4  BM  Reb
Control Variables  _' ,
Dependent  Variable  Lag t  0.4716-  0.6860-  0.4725-  0.6567...  0.4137~  -'  0.7118i-  0.3723-  0.7598-
(0.134)  {0.077)  (0.134)  (0.073)  ?014)  (0083),  ,  (0,149)  (0.093)
Index of Political Rights  0.0004  |.0003  0.0006  0.0007  0.A216-'  3ie!-0(5  0.0197  -0.0012
(0.003)1  :0.002)1  (0.004)  (0.002)  tO  0091  t  002)  '0  ,9  (0.012)  (0.003)
Agricultural Share(-)  -0.081  .0.0632  -0.0179  -0.1348  4 1161  .0091  . -02119  -0.0559
(0239)  0.06)  (0.232)  (0.064)  (0278)  -. t0073),"  '  (0.421)  (0.116)
Manufacturing  Share (+)  0.1985  .0.1274  0.2092  -0.1826  02608  -021,i 93  '-'  0.5289-  -0.1477
(0.19)  10.147)  (0.195)  (0.172)  102121  2  (0-.213)  (027)  (0.223)
Trade  Share (+)  -0.0069  0.0349-  -0.0058  0.0472-  -0 0108  0  . 04o.o  -040377  0.0479
(0.05)  (0.019)  (0.052)  (0.02)  10  0531  ;  (0.0,2)  (0.069)  (0.03)
Urban Population Share (+  -0.0146-  -0.0022-  -0.0145--  -0.003..  -040149'  . '-  '  0035."  4.013--  -0.0031--
(O.OD4)  (0.004)  ~  ~  ~ ~  cob~  (00001 (0.004)  10.01)  (0.0.001)0.OO1)  | 0.(005  (0.001)
Log of per  capita  0.2076-  (i.0478-  0.1954-  0.0626...  0.2197T.;  - 0.0578  ',  0.2319...  0.0454-
real  GDP  (4)  (0.042)  (0.022)  (0.044)  (0.021)  (0;,K94r')  . ,  (0  q0l17),  (0.055)  (0.024)
Governmnent  Crises (-)  0.0009  -0.0033  0.0004  -0.0044-  4 0005  -0.0005  .65E-05  0.0033
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  o0001  . (0 00'2 t ','1 (0,003)  (0.005)
Cost of Debt Servcing(-)  -0.0005  0.0066  -0.0013  0.0167  0014i  00109.  0  -00042  0.0154
(0.07)  ().029)  (0.069)  (0.028)  (0.064)  4  (0 028) r  (0.087)  (0.031)
Seigniorage (-)  -0.1745  4).0856  -0.1762  -0.0549  00985  e  .e  - 138-  0.0095  -0.0873
(0.114)  (0.0911  00.1161  b0.092  (  5)  (0.089)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
Unantidpated changes  -0.0539-  -.0899-  -0.0524  -0.0888  -0  0468-  -bg.,L  ,l  i  -0.0367  -0.0982--
In  real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.03)  (0.018)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.028),  (0O
2 1)f  1  (0.039)  (0.02)
(4 year, simple average)
Unantidpated changes  -0.0503  0.1133-  -0.0513  0.1001---  .0766  . Ot069f'  -0.077  0.0925-
In  per capita real GDP (4)  (0.048)  (0.026)  (0.047)  (0.023)  (0.053)  .. h (0 026);$  (0063)  (0.038)
(4 year. simole averag,le)  _  -a_____5_
uest-Mothe  VaiSablfes  _  r4  - I3i  .- 
Expected per capita reai  -0.2531  -0.0352  40.4593  -0.0405  07456. ;  -0 3773  -466879  -1.4684-
GDP Growth Rate (.)  (0277)  (0.186)  (0.314)  (0.227)  (O.318)  tb 443)  10  5231  (0.725)
Glni Coefficient (-)  0.0011  -0.0007  0.001  40.0001  0.0008  0-0001  3  0.0002  -0.0006
(adjusted. smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (00dO1)  . (0I003)  . l  (0.001)  (0.003)
UfeExpectancyatage65()  -0.0112  -0.0067  -0.0117  -0.007  .-,0119.<  -0102321  .- 0147  -0.0427-
lestimnaiel bv Method 21  oon  toloon  o.oo  tO71  i  j  oo  (Or  OiVl  g.(0  L..1..'' .''  '  .... tO023  .
constant  4  .9992-'  -0.1324  -0.8853"  -0.2578-  . 1.0336  0  .1037  - '0.9545-  02379
(0.352)  (0.100)  (0.371)  (0.120)  (0i3  7  (0'173  '  '^  10  479)  (0.303)
R-equared  0.8545  0.13015  0.8555  0.8158  0.6399  r,-0  .3  -3  0.8657  0.8046
Adjusted R-squared  0.8215  0.J598  0.8226  0.7733  '0.8392  b41  0.7903:  0.8299  0.7454
F-Statistic  45.78  579.63  45.27  812.07  49958  2979,.  77.82  32.70
F-Stat df 1  53  70  53  68  5  4-;-,  - 44  53
F-Stat df  2  233  338  233  307  212,  252  165  175
NunberofCountUes  20  38  20  38  20  -,-  36  *19  28
Numnber of Observations  287  410  287  379  263k  -,,  319.  229
Standard Errors  are  In parmnthreses.
danotas  significanca  at the 90. 95 and  99 percint confidence  level respectively
Robust standard erors obtained  using  WhIa's correction for hatermscedastcity.71
Table A3b
Sensitivity Analysis: Expected  Per Capita Growth Rate
Fixed (Country &  Time) Effects Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Central Govemment Budget Surplus Share
ExDected growth rate constructed using previous
15  ers  1  20  a  ar  25  ears  30 gears
Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing
Years  1975 -1992  BM  Real  la  BM  Reo  lb  I  M  Rea 2a  BM  Reg 2b  BM  Rea 3a  BM  Reg 3b  BM  Rea 4a  BM  Reg 4b
Control Variables
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.7186--  0.7980"  0.7223--  0.7761...  0.6932"-  0.8202^-,  0.6795...  0.93368
(0.075)  (0.099)  (0.075)  (0.104)  (0.078)  (0.12)  (0.082)  (0.15)
Index of Politcal  Rights  0.0169--  0.0049'  0.0161"  0.0044  0.0144-  0.0036  0.0117  0.0034
(0.006)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.005)
Agricultural  Share (-)  -0.135  0.0223  -0.1301  -0.0553  -0.208  -0.0686  -0.3732  0.1328
(0239)  (0.089)  (0.238)  (0.109)  (0.331)  (0.125)  (0.451)  (0.256)
Manufacturing  Share ()  -0.0358  -0.2813'  -0.0169  -0.3164-  0.1358  -0.2578  0.3824'  -0.2874
1  (0.136)  (0.167)  (0.135)  (0.179)  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.211)  (0.272)
Trade Share (+)  0.0605'  0.0479'  0.068'  0.0457'  0.0675'  0.0337  0.0878'  0.0505
(0.036)  (0.025)  (0.037)  (0.025)  (0.041)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.067)
Urban Populaton Share ()  -0.011  0.0001  -0.0091'--  0.0007  -0.0125'-  -0.0002  -0.0078  0.0017
(0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)
Log of per capita  0.1619--  0.0313  0.1423...  0.0233  0.1451"  0.0279  0.1454...  0.0357
real GDP (+)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.043)  (0.05)
Govemment  Crises (-)  -0.0009  -0.002  -0.0013  -0.0028  -0.0021  -0.0017  -0.0014  -0.018
(0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.037)
Cost  of Debt ServIcing (-)  0.0219  0.0217  0.0214  0.031  0.0572  0.0303  0.0798  0.0421
(0.088)  (0.028)  (0.069)  (0.029)  (0.074)  (0.032)  (0.104)  (0.037)
Seigniorage  (-)  .2305  -0.2041'  -0.2371  -0.1795  -0.1977  -0.214'  -0.1252  -0.1625
0.176)  (0.111)  I(0.175)  (0.1I  1)  (0.157)  l(0.11  5)  (0.15)  (0.131)
Tax-Smoothing Variables
Unantidpated changes  -0.0862"  -0.1332'-  -0.0881---  -0.1355-'  -0.0843"  -0.1484"'  -0.0905'  4.1592"
in  real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.02)  (0.031)  (0.02)  (0.033)  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.037)
(4  year, simple average)
UnanUdpated changes  0.0124  0.0997-  0.0301  0.0977"  0.0201  0.1111-  0.0473  0.11'
in  per capita real GDP  (+)  (0.043)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.05)  (0.059)  (0.065)
(4  year. simple averaae)  . . -
RPan. st-Mnlh,ag  VnrlahlPg
Expected per capita real  -0.7244'  0.0854  -0.6786."'  0.2332  -0.7806-  0.0979  -0.985"  0.3324
GDP Growth Rate (-)  (0.24)  (0.289)  (0.258)  (0.362)  (0.302)  (0.907)  (0.442)  (1.779)
Gini Coefficient (-)  0.0011'  -0.0007  0.001  -0.0001  o.0008  -0.001  -0.0002  -0.0006
(adjusted, smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)
Ufe Expectancy at age 65 (-)  0.0072  -0.0085  -0.0036  -0.0204  -0.0042  -0.0094  -0.0011  -0.0109
'estimated  bv Method 2)  Q~iL  ~  ~L0,005)  0.0012)  10.005)  L0.017)  (0.00S)  (.L021)  (0.007)  (0.03)
constant  -.4212  -0.1463  -0.4826  -0.0134  -0.5583  -0.0739  -0.7660  -0.1399
(0.350)  (0.197)  (0.382)  (0.29)  (0.39)  (0.456)  (0.637)  (0.522)
R-squared  0.9292  0.8432  0.9285  0.8540  0.9330  0.8565  0.9405  0.8502
Adjusted  R-squared  0.9071  0.7876  0.9061  0.7979  0.9112  0.7919  0.9178  0.7718
F-Statistic  1557.35  348.77  1222.30  459.02  845.70  3951.29  802.83  22.94
F-Stat df 1  50  54  50  53  47  51  41  43
F-Stat df 2  163  169  163  151  148  122  110  86
Number of Countries  17  26  17  25  17  24  16  20
Number of Observations  215  230  215  210  197  178  153  132
Standard Ernors  are In  parentheses.
-,  *-,  denotes sign8icance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confdene  level  respectively
Robust standard ormros  obtained using Whites corecuon for hoteroscedastidty.72
Table A4a
Sensitivity Analysis: Gini Coefficient
Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel  Regressions -- Missing Data Technique
Dependent Variable: Central Government Budget Surplus Share
,  ~~~~UsinaVrosMaue  fGn  ofiin 
Unadiusted  Adl  sted  Adiusted'and  Smoothed  s 
. Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  jDeveloped  iDei9.elb3ifig,
Years: 1975 -1992  B  MDRe5a  BM MD  Req 5b  BM MD  Re  6a  BM MDReyb  BM-DRe`7a.BM MDqR  7b
anntmrl V2riahles  at 58 iS7  *.tF;<' 
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.4107--  0.7177...  0.4107-  0.7165-  04137  0 7118  i
(0.134)  (0.083)  (0.134)  (0.083)  (0.134  *0083j
Index of Political Rights  0.0211-  -0.0002  0.0211-  -0.0002  0.0216,  ,  *  3.61E-05
(0.009)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0009)  (0002)
gricultural Share  (-)  -0.1224  -0.0942  -0.1224  -0.0945  -0 1161  . 0.0.91::,,
(0.279)  (0.074)  (0.279)  (0.074)  10.278)  (0.073)
Manufacturing  Share (+)  0.2866  -0.2176  0.2866  -0.2174  0.2808:,  . -0 2193
(0.212)  (0.213)  (0.212)  (0.213)  (0.2-12)  10 213)
Trade Share (+)  -0.0111  0.0496-  -0.0111  0.0497*  -00108)  . - 0 0486-  | 
(0.053)  (0.024)  (0.053)  (0.025)  (0.053)p.  (0.025)  -
rban Population Share (+)  -0.0154  -0.003---  -0.0154...  -0.003-  0:0149-  :-  -0.0035-  -.
(0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0 004) -7  (0.00.1,)
og  of per capita Real GDP  0.2189-  0.0501  - -0.2189...  0.0505...  0:2167"-  0.0578--.
(0.047)  (0.018)  (0.047)  (0.018)  (0,.0,47)  ,  .01,,,
ovemment Crises  (-)  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0003  O.Oo5  i  0`0005
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  *  - (0,002u)--
Cost of Debt Servicing(-)  0.017  0.0115  0.017  0.0117  0o  0145  ,,,  00109t-
(0.065)  (0.028)  (0.065)  (0.028)  (0.064)  (0028)
eigniorage(-)  -0.1016  -0.1206  -0.1016  -0.1203  -0.0985  -. 0138  .
(0.103)  (0.08)  (0.103)  (0.08)  (0'02)  4  (0!08)
Tax-Smoothina  Varables  *;_.'
nanticipated changes  -0.0471-  -0.0919--  -0.0471*  -0.0919--  -0 0468'  g  -0 0919  I  * i  -
n real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0 O28)"¢  F.  (0021)
(4 year, simple average)  . .
nanticipated changes  -0.0761  0.1084-  -0.0761  0.1083*  -0.066-  0.  1069-
n per capita real GDP (+)  (0.053)  (0.026)  (0.053)  (0.026)  (0.053)  (0 026),
4 year. simple averace)  *_.r_____r7S
RelAijAst-MntlivabVariabls..,.*w,......A  asx;  z  ;< 
Expected  per capita real  -0.7425--  -0.1356  -0.7425-  -0.1391  -0.7456"  -0  3773
DP Growth  Rate (-)  (0.317)  (0.442)  (0.317)  (0.442)  (0.318)  (0-443)
(25 year construction)
Ini Coefficient (-)  0.0007  0.0003  0.0007  0.0003  0.0008  - *.00i0  -
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  10.003)
ife Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0125  -0.0237-  -0.0125  -0.0233-  -0.0119  ?  - 0232
(estimated by Method 2)  ,  0.008)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.008)-.5  (io-  _______  .I,
constant  -11.0133-  0.0954  -1.0133--  0.0818  1 0336-  {  0.1347;^  ,  -
(0.378)  (0.172)  (0.378)  (0.172)  (0.379)  ,  (0173) '
R-squared  0.8650  0.8326  0.8658  0.8330  0.8699  . 0.8338
djusted R-squared  0.8331  0.7888  0.8342  0.7893  0.8392  0.7903  ,;
F-Statistic  48.27  279.95  48.28  280.29  49 58-'  269 79
F-Stat  df '  50  64  50  64  50  . 641
-Statdf2  212  252  212  252  212:  252  -
Numberof Countries  20  36  20  36  20  36  -
Number of Observations  263  319  263  319  263  319.
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
*, ",  - denotes significance at the 90, 95 and 99 percent confidence  level respectively
Robust standard errors  obtained using White's correction for heteroscedasticity.73
Table A4b
Sensitivity Analysis: Gini Coefficient
Fixed (Country & Time) Effects Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable:  Central Govemment Budget Surplus Share
UsinVarious MeasuresofGini  ient
Unaiusted  ted  r  Adiusted and Smoothed
Developed  Developing  lDeveloped  Developing  Developed  Developing
Years: 1975 -1992  BM Rea Sa  BM Rea 5b  IBRe6a  BM Rea 6b  BM Reg 7a  IBM Reg 7b
Cnntmol  tariahlAs
ependent  Variable Lag 1  0.6902...  0.8261-  0.6902--  0.8249...  0.6932-  0.8202..
(0.078)  (0.124)  (0.078)  (0.122)  (0.078)  (0.12)
ndex of Political Rights  0.0139"  0.0034  0.0139"  0.0034  0.0144"  0.0036
(0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)
Agricultural  Share (-)  -0.2143  -0.0718  -0.2143  -0.072  -0.208  -0.0686
(0.326)  (0.126)  (0.326)  (0.127)  (0.331)  (0.125)
Manufacturing  Share (+)  0.1416  -0.2561  0.1416  -0.2558  0.1358  -0.2578
(0.152)  (0.236)  (0.152)  (0.235)  (0.15)  (0.24)
Trade  Share (+)  0.0671'  0.0346  0.0671-  0.0348  0.0675'  0.0337
(0.04)  (0.051)  (0.04)  (0.052)  (0.041)  (0.052)
rban Population Share (+)  -0.013'"  0.0003  -0.013...  0.0003  -0.0125--  -0.0002
(0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)
of per capita Real GDP  0.1473"-  0.0202  0.1473---  0.0207  0.1451--  0.0279
(0.039)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.029)  (0.041)  (0.032)
Govemment  Crises (-)  -0.002  -0.0014  -0.002  -0.0014  -0.0021  -0.0017
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
Cost of Debt Servicing (-)  0.0597  0.0309  0.0597  0.0311  0.0572  0.0303
(0.074)  (0.031)  (0.074)  (0.032)  (0.074)  (0.032)
eigniorage (-)  -0.2008  -0.1966'  -0.2008  -0.1963'  -0.1977  -0.214
(0.157)  (0.114)  (O.157)  (0.115)  (0.157)  (0.115)
Tax-Smoothing  Variables
nanticipated  changes  -0.0846---  0.1484..  -0.0846"*'  -0.1484-'  -0.0843-'  -0.1484..
n real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.019)  (0.033)  (0.019)  (0.033)
4 year, simple average)
nanticipated changes  0.0207  0.1126"  0.0207  0.1125-  0.0201  0.1111"
n per capita real GDP (+)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.05)
year. simple average)
pected per capita real  -0.7775--  0.3396  -0.7775--  0.336  -0.7806-  0.0979
DP Growth  Rate (-)  (0.296)  (0.824)  (0.296)  (0.867)  (0.302)  (0.907)
25 year construction)
Sin  Coefficient (-)  0.0007  0.0003  0.0007  0.0003  0.0008  -0.001
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)
ife Expectancy at age 65 (-)  -0.0048  -0.0099  -0.0048  -0.0095  -0.0042  -0.0094
estimated by Method 2)  (0.006)  (0.021)  I0.006)  (0.021)  (0.006)  (0.021)
onstant  -0.6384  -0.1144  -0.6384  -0.1279  -0.5583  -0.0739
(0.390)  (0.435)  (0.390)  (0.451)  (0.39)  (0.456)
R-squared  0.9331  0.8564  0.9331  0.8564  0.9330  0.8565
diusted R-squared  0.9114  0.7917  0.9114  0.7917  0.9112  0.7919
F-Statistic  837.21  8520.10  837.21  1949.96  845.70  3951.29
-Stat  df 1  47  51  47  50  47  51
F-Stat df 2  148  122  148  122  148  122
umber of  Countries  17  24  17  24  17  24
qumber of Observations  197  178  197  178  197  178
Standard Errors  are in  parentheses.  .
,"  - denotes signflcance at the  90, 95 and 99 percent  confidence level respecUvely
Robust standard errors obtalned using White's correcton for  heteroscedastidcty.74
Table A5a
Sensitivity Analysis: Using Various Measures of Expected Longevity
Fixed (Country &  Time)  Effects Panel Regressions - Missing Data Technique
Depenident Variable: Central  Govemment Budget Surplus Share
Using Various  Measures  of Expected Longevitv
Llfe  Expectancy  Life Expectancy  Estimated  Life Expectancy  4,Estimrated Llfe Expedancy,-
at lirth  at aae 65  1  at aoe 65 (Method  1)  iThaide 65iMethod  h.-
Developed  |  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  D6iil6Dplhbi,
Years:1975 -1992  BM  MD ReSo  BM MD  Rea 8b  B  BM  MReaM  go  a  DD  0cBgD  tObB  3MMD  i  8  'M 41  ib
Control Variables  ,  ,  f  ii.:4;
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.4189  0.6889--  0.8198'-  0.3427'  0.41 15--  0.70986  .1371,  00b1,8V-
(0.132)  (0.086)  (0.07)  (0.194)  (0.133)  (0.083)  (9O.134)  ,t',,  tO  033)
Index of Poliical Rights  0.0217"  0.0002  0.0192--  0.0005  0.0213-  3.30E-05  O  3  1E  3 6E
(0.009)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.00. . (0.002
Agricultural Share (-  -0.0873  -0.0764  -0.1581  0.0599  -0.0974  -0.0882  ;i,6  :O  0O:.1
(0277)  (0.075)  (0256)  (0.145)  (0277)  (0.073)  (O.2),8  (0073)
Manufacturing Share (+)  0.2477  -0.1497  0.3102"  0.6121"  0.2386  -0.2194  0  .'  .2193
(0.202)  (0.185)  (0.14)  (0243)  (0.2)  (0.213)  (b'212)'C  - (0213)
Trade Share (+)  -0.0053  0.0407'  0.0336  -0.048  -0.0043  0.0478'  Z.0i.  ,  . l  . 00486
(0.055)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.046)  (0.055)  (0.024)  (-
4 o  05 ir  ;;  (0025)
Urban Population Share (+)  -0.0148--  -0.0037-"  -0.01368  -0.0005  -0.0152-  -0.0035.  - -0 0035
(0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0¢  j  (0,OO01,i1-,,,'  ;
Log of per capita Real GDP  02112...  0.0598"'  0.1566"  0.0588-  0.2151...  0.0585" - Q2167"'  00578",'  'u
(0.045)  (.1)  (0.035)  (0.06  -0046)  (0.018)  007  5'(,,Mt>  ;@,-
Govemrnment Crises  (-)  -0.0007  -0.0014  -0.0012  0.004  -0.0007  -0.0005  -0 O  a . ;  oosI'¾
~~~~~~~~~~~(0.001)  (0.002)  (.0)  (.0)  (.0)  (0.002)  (0  01
Cost of Debt Servcing (-)  0.0177  0.0076  -0.0048  0.045  0.0146  0.0114  0.01AS&,A.  0,010
(0.065)  (0.028)  (0.061)  (0.041)  (0.065)  (0.028)  004  i,  (00  §
Seigniorage  (-)  -0.0978  -0.1391  -40.1151  -0.1241  -0.0938  -0.11383-  i,  0  *  41 tg  -0136-
(0.102)  10.08'  (0.106)  (0.106)  10.1021  (0.08)  102)  08)
Tax-Smoothing  Variables  l Y,  ,.  ta
Unanticipated  changes  -0.0469-  -0.0879..  -0.0709-  -0.0556'  -0.0469-  -0.0918---  ):04681  -00919,  .
in reel per  capiia govt exp (-)  (0.028)  li(0.02)  (0.024)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (  t  (0021)
(4  year,  simple average)  f  ,
Unantidpated  changes  -0.0737  0.1032..  -0.0274  0.0674  -0.0754  0.1066-  -,07766  01069
in per capita real GDP (+)  (0.053)  (0.025)  (0.041)  (0.046)  (0.053)  (0.026)  to 053)  t  o 0261
(4 year,  simple averaae)  i__;,,.  .
Renuest-Mofiya  VrahPSS  .
Expected per capita real  -0.7213-  -0.1835  -1.1383--  -1.6807-  -0.6919--  -.4034  7,,456,,  -03773  .
GDP  Growth Rate (-)  (0.318)  (0.504)  (0.32)  (0.986)  (0.313)  (0.442)  (0:318*8;K  (0O443ys,
(25  year construction)  !..  :
Gini Coefficient(-)  0.0008  -0.0019  0.0001  -0.0006  0.0009  -.001  00.0008  *;0011
(adiusted,  smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  -k  (0003),
Expeedancy Longevity (-)  -0.0055  0.0088-  -0.0077"  -0.0004  -0.0129  40.0226-  Oi.-9i  -0.0232  ' 
(O  ((Si  Ong)5  to.03  °-°0ll  (a  '0n009  In ON)  (0.08  Oil.;  (901i  -
constant  -0.7716  40.7534  -0.6116"  -0.3303  -0.9933--  0.1305  1.'0336^  0 1347-
(0.535)  (0.419)  (0.289)  (0258)  (0.397)  (0.17)  (  3i9)  (073) 
R-squared  0.8708  0.8454  0.9106  0.8098  0.8707  0.8344  08699  33-  06--338  -A
Adjusted R-squared  0.8403  0.8049  0.8882  0.7007  0.8402  0.7911  0  8392  0  37933,'- 
F-Statistic  48.57  39.31  54.47  14.65  48.98  290.79  49.58  .4  2697i9
F-Stat  df1  50  34  50  46  50  64  5  0  6,  ;  .
F-Statdf2  212  252  200  82  212  319  2.1,,  1'  252
Number of Countries  20  36  20  17  20  36
Number of Observations  263  319  251  130  263  319  263*  . 39  J
Standard Emraa  are in parentheses.
, -,  denotes significance  at the  90, 95 and  99 perent confidence  level  respectvely
Robust stendard  erraa obtained using  Whltes correcton for hateroscedastcity.75
Table A5b
Sensitivity Analysis: Using Various Measures of Expected Longevity
Fixed (Country &  Time) Effects Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Central Govemment Budget Surplus Share
Usina Various  Measurs  of Expected Longevitv
Life Expedancy  Life Expectancy  Estimated  Life Expectancy  Estimated Life Expectancy
at Birth  at an  65  a  o  5{ehd1)  a  u  5{ehd2
Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing  Developed  Developing
Years :1975 -1992  BM  Rea8Sa  8M ,Rea  b  BM  Rea ga  BM  Rea 9b  BM  Rea 1  Oa  BM  0  BM Rea  la  IBMRen 1b
Control Variables
Dependent  Variable Lag 1  0.7023-  O.7984*  O.6771-  0.4874-  0.7016***  0.8186-  0.6932-  O.8202
(0.076)  (0.118)  (0.077)  (0235)  (0.076)  (0.12)  (0.078)  (0.12)
Index of Political Rights  0.015-  0.005  0.0158s  -0.0061  0.0149  0.0036  0.0144  0.0036
(0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)
Agricufural Share (-)  -0.1925  -0.0494  -0.3088  -0.4728  -0.1931  -0.0685  -0208  40.0686
(0.331)  (0.122)  (0.338)  (0.217)  (0.331)  (0.125)  (0.331)  (0.125)
Manufacturing Share (+)  0.1205  -0.2148  0.2247  -0.0652  0.1205  -0.2579  0.1358  4.2578
(0.148)  (0.209)  (0.161)  (0.328)  (0.148)  (0.24)  (0.15)  (0.24)
Trade Share (+)  0.0691-  0.0279  0.0692-  0.062  0.069-  0.0336  0.0675-  0.0337
(0.04)  (0.047)  (0.04)  (0.071)  (0.04)  (0.052)  (0.041)  (0.052)
Urban Population  Share ()  -0.0116  -0.0006  -0.0131  0.0003  -0.0117  -0.0002  4.0125  -0.0002
(0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)
Log of percapta Real GDP  0.1411  0.031  0.1442  -0.0541  0.1414---  0.028  0.1451  0.0279
(0.04)  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.055)  (0.04)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.032)
Govemment Crtses (-)  -0.002  4.0017  -0.0015  -0.0057-  4.002  -0.0017  4.0021  4.0017
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)
Cost of Debt Servicing (-)  0.0603  0.0279  0.0165  0.1187-  0.06  0.0307  0.0572  0.0303
(0.075)  (0.032)  (0.071)  (0.052)  (0.075)  (0.032)  (0.074)  (0.032)
Seigniorage(-)  40.1966  -0.209-  4.1934  40.1566  -0.1967  4.2155  -0.1977  4.214
(0.157)  (0.12)  (015s)  (0.125)  (0.157)  (0.1151  (0.157)  (0.115)
Tax-Smoothing  Vadables
Unanticipated  changes  4.0851-  -0.1434-  40.0853-  4.1074  4.0851  4.1482.  4.0843  4.1484
In  real per capita govt exp (-)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.033)  (0.019)  (0.033)
(4  year, simple average)
Unanticipated  changes  0.0251  0.10851  0.0095  0.1411  0.0247  0.1111  0.0201  0.1111
in  per capita real GDP (+)  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.047)  (0.084)  (0.049)  (0.05)  (0.049)  (0.05)
v4  year. simple averene)
Benuent-Motivee  Variables
Expected per capita real  4.7528-  4.1997  -0.9733-  2A799  -0.751"  0.0867  -0.7806  0.0979
GDP Growth Rate (-)  (0.305)  (0.812)  (0.325)  (2.043)  (0.306)  (0.896)  (0.302)  (0.907)
(25 year construction)
Gini Coefficient (-)  0.0008  4.0019  0.0001  40.0006  0.0009  4.001  0.0008  -0.001
(adjusted, smoothed)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.003)
Expectancy Longevity (-)  -0.0007  0.0067  -0.0053  4.0072  4.0015  4.0102  4.0042  -0.0094
(0_003_  (.  0071  On.03  (0,012  (0.007Z  {0 02  to  s  g(.021
constant  4.5952  -0.6034  -0.4214  02731  -0.6237  4.0590  4.5583  40.0739
(0.461)  (0.692)  (0.404)  (0.777)  (0.401)  (0.449)  (0.39)  (0.456)
R-squared  0.9327  0.8585  0.9374  0.8762  0.9327  0.8566  0.9330  0.8565
Adjusted R-squared  0.9109  0.7948  0.9162  0.7289  0.9109  0.7920  0.9112  0.7919
F-Staistic  852.02  1179.83  820.55  24.77  847.44  7834.95  845.70  3951.29
F-Stat  df 1  47  50  47  40  47  51  47  51
F-Stat df 2  148  122  142  37  148  122  148  122
Number  of Countries  17  24  17  13  17  24  17  24
Number  of Observations  197  178  191  82  197  178  197  178
Standard Errmr  are tn  parentheses.
1.  ,  denotes significance at the 90,  95 and  99 percent confidence  level rspefIvety
RbsOt standard eans obtalned usinrg l  WhiWs correcon for heteroscedasdcity.76
Table A6a
OLS Regressions for Estimating  Life Expectancy at Age 65
Method I
Dependent Variable:  I  to  vears  pectan
Liff  Exg2rtancv at Age 65  1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-89  1990-97  1950-59  1960-69  1970-79  1980-89  1990-97
Lffe  expectancy at birth  0.1102-  0.0752...  0.0896-  0.1656-  0.0988-  0.3959 - 0.4105-  0.5109...  0.5180...  0.4609...
(0.0076)  (0.000'7)  (0.0260)  (0.0437)  (0.0260)  (0.0704)  (0.0334)  (0.0345)  (0.0321)  (0.0314)
constant  6.026r-  8.3121--  7.9439~-  2.7567-*  7.5100-  -13.7607-  -15.0343--  -22.3203--  -22.9241--  -18.4037...
(0.4669)  (0.5944)  (1.6109)  (2.7964)  (1.7157)  (5.0781)  (2.4102)  (2.5237)  (2.4003)  (2.3992)
R-squared  0.6158  0.3912  0.2201  0.2421  0.3480  0.3782  0.6234  0.6050  0.5914  0.6825
Adjusted R-squared  0.6129  0.3847  0.2016  0.2252  0.3238  0.3663  0.6193  0.6022  0.5891  0.6793
F-Statistic  209.98  59.76  11.86  14.37  14.41  31.63  150.64  219.03  261.98  214.92
F-Stat  df I  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
F-Stat df 2  131  93  42  45  27  52  91  143  181  100
Number of Observatlons  133  95  44  47  29  54  93  145  183  102
Standard Encre ame  In  parentheseo.
denotes  signiflcanoe at the 90. 95  and  99 poerent confidence  level respectvely
Table A6b
OLS Regressions for Estimating Life Expectancy at Age 65
Method 2
Dependent Variable:  than 70 years
Life Expectancv at Ace 65  195G-59  196049  1970-79  1980-9  1990-97  1950-79  1  1980-89  I  990-97
Life expectancy at birth  0.1102  0.0752-  0.08968  0.1656w  0.0988  0.4644--  -7.2842-  -4.1358--
(0.0076)  (0.0097)  (0.0260)  (0.0437)  (0.0260)  (0.0704)  (1.9910)  (1.5799)
(Life expectancy at birth)'  0.0522--  0.0304--
(0.0133)  (0.0105)
constant  6.0267  8.3127  7.9439-  2.7567  7.5100-  -13.7607*1*  268.2128...  155.0159-
(0.4669)  (0.5944)  (1.6109)  (2.7964)  (1.7157)  (5.0781)  (74.3211)  (59.6366)
R-squared  0.6158  0.3912  0.2201  0.2421  0.3480  0.3782  0.6235  0.7075
Adjusted  R-squared  0.6129  0.3847  0.2016  0.2252  0.3238  0.3663  0.6193  0.7016
F-Statistic  209.98  59.76  11.86  14.37  14.41  31.63  149.06  119.72
F-Stat  df I  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  1
F-Statdf 2  131  93  42  45  27  52  180  100
Number of Observations  133  35  44  47  29  54  183  102
Standard Errom  are in  parentheses.
denotes significance at the  90,  95 and 99 percent confidence  level respectively77
Figure Al
Lowess Plot of Life Expectancy at Age 65 against Life Expectancy at Birth
(1950-1997)
Lowess smoother, bandwidth = .5
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Figure Ala
Lowess Plot of Life Expectancy at Age 65 against Life Expectancy at Birth
(1950-1959)
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Figure Al b
Lowess Plot of Life Expectancy at Age 65 against Life Expectancy at Birth
(1960-1969)
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Figure Al1c
Lowess Plot of Life Expectancy at Age 65 against Life Expectancy at Birth
(1  970-1 979)
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Figure AId
Lowess Plot of Life Expectancy at Age 65 against Life Expectancy at Birth
(1  980-1 989)
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Figure Ale
Lowess Plot of Life Expectancy at Age 65 against Life Expectancy at Birth
(1990-1997)
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